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THE PRIVATE SECTOR
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law changes. Sometimes the change is slow, perhaps agonizing,
as in the case of labor law. Sometimes the change is swift and amicable
as when a uniform code is universally accepted. But sometimes the law
appears to stand still. Then, as society undergoes profound evolution,
the law lurches and jerks about, trying to dispense justice with outmoded
concepts in an alien context. If the legislatures fail to come to the rescue,
it then devolves upon the courts to cut the traces and institute reforms.
Such has been the case with the law of landlord and tenant.
The massive changes that have been wrought recently in this
area-principally by the judiciary-are the result of a number of factors. First, it has become increasingly clear that the conceptual framework of landlord-tenant law, developed in the context of a feudal, agrarian society, cannot be applied satisfactorily to the urban segments of
contemporary society. Urban landlords can and do exercise more control over leased property than their rural counterparts. Moreover, severe
housing shortages have virtually eliminated the presumed bargaining
power of the tenant, particularly the indigent tenant. Secondly, courts
have long understood that a lease is in some respects a conveyance of a
nonfreehold estate, in other respects a contract. Traditionally, however,
the landlord-favoring conveyance concept has predominated. The application of this concept in an urban residential context where rental agreements are primarily contractual in nature produces inequitable, if not
absurd, results. Thirdly, the assumption of the landlord role by the
government through the development of public housing and the financing of private low-rent housing have added constitutional nuances to old
landlord-tenant problems and raised some entirely new issues as well.
Finally, some courts have begun to take an activist stance in dealing
with contemporary landlord-tenant questions. Adjusting existing concepts and creating some totally new ones, these courts are demonstrating an increasing sensitivity to the needs of tenants. The decisions they
have handed down may properly be regarded as revolutionary.
The law schools have been slow to respond to the recent upheaval
in landlord-tenant law by offering courses that concentrate on that field.
Moreover, texts, treatises, casebooks, and restatements are only beginning to reflect the new character of this area of the law. Recognizing
the need of practitioners, teachers, and students for a roadmap through
the maze of contemporary landlord-tenant law, the Vanderbilt Law
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Review offers this annotated bibliography as its Special Project.
Because of its unusual format, a word of explanation is necessary.
The Project is divided into two parts, dealing respectively with private
and public landlord-tenant law. The private law part is further divided
into sections, each of which is devoted to an issue of current significance.
Within the sections, the following headings are used:
Development.-IHere,the issue with which the section is concerned
is identified and the relevant terms defined. The purpose of this subsection is to orient the reader. Thus, only the most general discussion of
the issue is offered, with no attempt at analysis. For this reason no
authority is cited.
Leading Cases.-The cases of major significance in the area and
those discussed in the secondary material are identified and summarized.
Jurisdictions.-Onegoal of this Project is to identify major trends
involving the developments treated. This subsection consists primarily
of citations to cases and statutes that represent such trends. Cases and
citations are listed in this subsection in alphabetical order by jurisdiction.
Periodicals.-Thesignificant secondary literature commenting on
the development under consideration is summarized and annotated in
this subsection.
Annotations.-The citations in this subsection are to American
Law Reports and the Commerce Clearinghouse Poverty Law Reporter.
Model Act and Uniform Code.-In recent years, comprehensive

statutory reforms of residential landlord-tenant law have been offered.
Among the most significant of these are the ABF MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (1969) (tentative draft) and the UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (1972). The former, a product of the American Bar Foundation, will be referred to in this Project
as the Model Code. The latter, drafted and approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will be referred
to as the Uniform Act. Relevant sections of both are summarized
throughout Part One of the Project.
On occasion, treatises and model briefs will be cited under appropriate headings.
Throughout the private law portion of the Project, the terms
"lease," "lease agreement," and "rental agreement" are used. Often the
context will indicate whether a written or oral agreement is being considered. Otherwise the terms are used interchangeably.

1973]

CONTEMPORARY LANDLORD-TENANT LAW

693

Part Two of the Project deals with special problems in landlordtenant law arising from the public housing and government assisted
housing context. Here the relevant cases, statutes, regulations, and commentaries are fewer in number than their private law counterparts.
Moreover, since the questions involved in public landlord-tenant law are
primarily federal, a discussion of trends is necessarily different from a
discussion of trends in a state common law context. Consequently a
different format is employed in this part of the Project. The major
developments are textually summarized with the bibliographic material
presented in footnotes.
One point must be emphasized. This Project is not intended to serve
as a final source of substantive law. Reference to an annotated bibliography does not eliminate the need to consult the cited materials directly.
Our purpose, rather, is to provide a comprehensive compendium of
authoritative statements on modern landlord-tenant law and thereby
increase the efficiency of research in this area. We hope that our efforts
will prove useful toward this end.
II.

LANDLORD'S REMEDIES

A.

Contract

1. Security Deposits
Development
The tenant's payment of money to the landlord on the execution
of a lease raises four basic issues concerning the nature of the payment
and the rights of the parties.
Purpose of the payment.-The purpose of the payment depends on
the intention of the parties entering the lease agreement and frequently
will be given the construction most favorable to the tenant. The payment
may be (1) advance payment of rent, (2) consideration for granting the
lease, (3) liquidated damages, or (4) a deposit to secure payment of rent
or fulfillment of all lease covenants. Only the last of these four is properly described as a security deposit, although modern statutes often
treat alike advance payments of rent and security deposits. Consideration for granting a lease seldom causes problems unless an inartfully
drawn lease agreement fails to articulate clearly the intentions of the
parties. Liquidated damages clauses frequently are subject to challenge
as penalties which are disfavored and unenforceable.
Nature of the deposit.-A deposit to secure payment of rent or
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performance of covenants may be characterized as a pledge, a trust
fund, or a debt. Title and permissible use of the fund depend primarily
upon the characterization and purpose of the payment. Ascertaining the
nature of the payment is especially important if one of the parties becomes insolvent during the term of the lease. Many state statutes now
resolve these questions.
Permissible use of the security deposit.-Statutes or the lease
agreement itself may impose limits upon the lessor's use of the security
deposit. The lessor may be prohibited from commingling the funds with
his own and may be required to pay interest to the lessee.
Disposition of the security deposit.-The landlord may retain the
security deposit until the tenant renders the performance secured by the
deposit, unless the landlord wrongfully evicts the tenant or misuses the
deposit. The money paid as security constitutes a fund upon which the
landlord may draw to compensate himself for a tenant's breach of covenants covered by the security. The tenant is entitled to the timely return
of the deposit subject only to the rightful claims of the landlord consistent with the lease provisions.
Recently, states have reflected a marked trend toward statutory
treatment of the major security deposit questions. Since 1970, thirteen
states have initiated regulation of security deposits or have substantially
rewritten the security deposit sections in their landlord-tenant codes.
These new state statutes generally provide nonwaivable protections to
the tenant.
Some of the statutes cover only residential leases. Frequently they
broadly define a security deposit to include any payment or deposit of
money (including an advance payment of rent), the primary function of
which is to secure the performance of a rental agreement or any part of
such an agreement. Many statutes state that the tenant's claim to such
a deposit shall be prior to the claim of any of the landlord's creditors,
although California's law grants a prior claim to a trustee in bankruptcy. All of the new statutes regulate the manner in which the landlord
may use or hold the security deposit funds. Some statutes characterize
the landlord as a trustee holding for the benefit of tenants, and most
prohibit the commingling of such funds. Additionally, some require the
payment of interest to the tenant. Finally, most of the new statutes
require repayment or itemized justification of the retention of the deposit within a strictly enforced time period ranging from two weeks to
forty-five days.
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Jurisdictions
The following jurisdictions have statutes regulating security deposits:
CAL.

CIV. § 1951.7 (Supp. 1973).

REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28 (Supp. 1971).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5112 (Supp. 1970).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.261 (Supp. 1972).
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 521-44 (Supp. 1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 91-93 (Supp. 1972).
LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:3251-:3254 (Supp. 1972).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, §§ 41-43G (Supp. 1972).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1972).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.19 (Supp. 1972).
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:6-43, 46:8-19, -26 (Supp. 1972).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS §§ 7-101 to -105 (McKinney Supp.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 250.512 (Supp. 1972).

COLO.

1972).

Periodicals
Bernstein, Security Deposits, 46 TAXES 214 (1968)-discusses the tests
for determining when a security deposit is taxable income in the
year it is received by the landlord.
Gleick, Rent Claims and Security Deposits in Bankruptcy, 18 Mo.
L. REV. 1 (1953)-studies the provability of claims in bankruptcy
for future rent and breaches of covenants to pay rent and the
effects of bankruptcy on the parties to a security deposit agreement. In many states these topics are now covered by statute.
Klamen, Landlord, Tenant, and Lender Lease Security Deposit
Problems, 7 LAW NOTES 123 (1971)-provides a thorough,
practitioner-oriented study dealing with commercial lease security
deposit problems. Klamen notes the risks to lessees resulting from
the use of security deposit funds as working capital by real estate
developers/promoters.
Weiss, Security v. Advance Rent Under the Federal Income Tax, 42
CONN. B.J. 356 (1968-draws the distinction between advance rent
and security deposits, explains the tax consequences of the distinctions, and provides some drafting suggestions.
Wilson, Lease Security Deposits, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1934)provides an overview of all the basic security deposit considerations, although dated in its citations and references to common
practices.
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Report of the Committee on Leases, Security Deposits and Guaranties
Under Leases, 1 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 405 (1966)-offers
the most comprehensive recent treatment of modern security deposit problems. This fully documented study gives a detailed analysis of the subject and suffers only from the fact that it was written
prior to the recent enactment of security deposit statutes in many
states.
Note, The Rental Security Deposit in California, 22 HASTINGS L.J.
1373 (1971)-critically analyzes the recently passed California
Security Deposit law by comparing the California law with the
broader and, it is contended, more effective security deposit laws
of New York and New Jersey.
Annotations
Lessor's right, upon bankruptcy,. to enforce lien or retain securityfor
future rentals, 22 A.L.R. 1307 (1923), supplemented by 45 A.L.R.
717 (1926).
Provision in lease for pecuniary forfeiture where lease is prematurely
terminatedas one for liquidateddamages, 106 A.L.R. 292 (1937).
Right of lessor to retain advance rental payments made under lease
terms upon lessee's default in rent, 27 A.L.R.2d 656 (1953).
Model Code
Section 2-401 is similar to many recently adopted state statutes. It
defines a security deposit broadly to include all funds paid for the purpose of securing performance of lease agreements. The tenant's claim
to the fund is superior to the landlord's creditors, including a trustee in
bankruptcy. The landlord is not, however, required to pay interest on
the deposit. Willful failure to return the deposit is punishable as a
misdemeanor. In the event the landlord absconds with security deposit
funds, his successor is not liable for them to the tenant.
Uniform Act
Security is limited in section 2.101 to an amount not in excess of
one month periodic rent. If the security is applied to payment of accrued
rent and actual damage, itemized written notice of such application
together with the amount due must be delivered to the tenant within
fourteen days after termination of the tenancy and delivery of possession
and demand by the tenant. Noncompliance with this section by the
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landlord gives rise to liability to the tenant for damages equal to twice
the amount wrongfully withheld, reasonable attorney's fees, and any
money properly due the tenant. The holder of the landlord's interest at
the time of termination is bound by the section. No provision protects
the tenant's interest in the deposit from the claims of other creditors of
the landlord. The landlord is not required to pay interest.
2.

Repairs

Development
The tenant has a limited duty to repair the leased premises for the
benefit of the landlord. This duty, raised by an implied covenant said
to exist in all tenancies, may be expanded or limited by express covenants or by statute. To the extent that the tenant controls the premises,
he impliedly covenants to use them in a tenant-like manner and is
obligated to provide for repairs necessitated by his fault, negligence, or
misuse of the property. The tenant is not liable for normal wear and
tear, nor, in the absence of fault, is he obligated to make major, substantial, or lasting repairs. There is authority, however, for requiring a
tenant to take reasonable care to prevent decay or delapidation of the
premises.
Modifications of the tenant's duty to repair arising from express
covenants and state statutes are treated in detail in the annotations listed
below. Express general covenants to repair and repairs required by
public authorities have required special statutory and case law alterations of common law rules. Cf Waste, infra at 698.
Leading Case
Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 451
P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969)-treats the major issues arising
under modern constructions of the tenant's duty to repair.
Periodicals
Comment, Periodic Tenant's Repair Obligation in Absence of
Covenant, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 58 (1957).
Annotations
Extent of lessee's obligation under express covenant as to repairs,
45 A.L.R. 12 (1926), supplemented by 20 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951).
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Liability of tenant for damage to the leased property due to his acts
or neglect, 10 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1950).
Measure and items of damages for lessee's breach of covenant as to
repairs, 80 A.L.R.2d 983 (1961).
Who, as between landlord and tenant, must make, or bear expense of,
alterations, improvements, or repairs ordered by public
authorities, 22 A.L.R.3d 521 (1968).
Model Code and Uniform Act
The implied covenant to repair and the tort of waste have been
combined in the Model Code and the Uniform Act. For appropriate
provisions see infra at 699.
B.

Tort-Waste
Development

Waste is a species of tort arising when the tenant violates his obligation to treat the leasehold in such a manner that it is not damaged
and may revert to those holding a permanent interest undeteriorated by
any willful or negligent act. Thus, waste is the destruction, misuse,
neglect, or alteration of the premises to the detriment of the reversionary interest.
The rules of law constituting the waste doctrine are designed to
regulate the tenant's conduct while he is legally in possession of the
leasehold. These rules of law rest primarily on common law developments although some states have adopted statutory standards to protect
the reversionary interests. Waste issues raise questions of fact concerning the nature of the premises, the local customs, and the reasonableness
of the tenant's use.
Court decisions have divided waste into two classes: voluntary and
permissive. Voluntary waste results from affirmative acts of the tenant;
permissive waste is the consequence of the tenant's failure to act. In
most instances, the tenant is liable for voluntary waste. While judicially
developed standards vary more widely in regard to the tenant's liability
for permissive waste, the tenant's negligence is generally prerequisite to
finding permissive waste.
Depending on state statutes and traditional rules, the remedies for
waste available to the landlord may include injunction, forfeiture, or
damages. In many situations, the tort action for waste provides the
landlord with a cause of action additional or alternative to the contract
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action for breach of an express or implied covenant to repair. Cf. Repairs, supra at 697.
The promulgation of housing and building codes and the modern
redefining of landlord and tenant remedies may lead to alterations in
the concept of waste by placing affirmative duties of maintenance on
the tenant. This is suggested by the provisions of the Model Code and
Uniform Act discussed below.
Periodicals
Comment, Periodic Tenant's Repair Obligation in Absence of
Covenant, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 58 (1957).
Annotations
Construction and effect of statutory provisions for double or treble
damages against tenant committing waste, 45 A.L.R. 771 (1926).
Right of mortgagee to maintain suit to stay waste, 48 A.L.R. 1156
(1927).
Limitation of action against tenant for years or for life for waste or
breach of obligation as to use and care of property, 53 A.L.R. 46
(1928).
Waste, as between landlord and tenant, as including loss or damages
due to act or negligence of third person, 84 A.L.R. 393 (1933).
Liability of tenant for damage to the leased property due to his acts
or neglect, 10 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1950).
Measure of damages in landlord's action for waste against tenant,
82 A.L.R.2d 1106 (1962).
Model Code
The Model Code substantially alters the common law rules of
waste. While at common law the landlord was required to show either
damage to his reversion or the tenant's lack of due care, the Code
imposes affirmative duties on the tenant and lends statutory support to
reasonable regulations that the landlord may choose to implement. Sections 2-303, -311. The Code lists specific tenant obligations in regard
to garbage, sanitation, and plumbing and electrical fixtures. Sections 2303(l)-(4). Furthermore, it incorporates the common law waste prohibition of willful and wanton destruction and holds the tenant liable for
such acts committed with his permission. Section 2-303(5). The landlord
is provided with an immediate remedy for the tenant's failure to fulfill
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his duties of maintenance and care of the premises. If the tenant does
not meet his section 2-303 obligations within a reasonable time after
written notice, the landlord may remedy such failure and charge the
tenant reasonable expenses treating them as rent due. Section 2-304.
The Model Code exempts the tenant from the common law duty
of making minor repairs necessary to prevent further damage to the
premises, but imposes on him the duty to report to the landlord as soon
as practicable the need for such repairs. Section 2-304. The tenant is
liable for damage or injury resulting from failure to report defective
conditions. Section 2-306.
Whereas the common law rules of waste subjected a tenant to
potential liability for making alterations in the property even if the
changes increased the value of the property, the Model Code gives a
tenant a complete defense to such an action if he has notified the landlord in advance of his intention to make alterations and if the alterations
are reasonable in light of the nature and location of the premises. Section 3-401.
Uniform Act
In sections 3.101 and 4.201, the Uniform Act places upon the
tenant the following affirmative duties:
(1) compliance with applicable provisions of building and housing
codes materially affecting health and safety;
(2) maintenance of the premises in as clean and safe condition as
practicable;
(3) disposal of waste in a clean and safe manner;
(4) maintenance of plumbing fixtures in as clean a condition as
practicable;
(5) use of facilities and appliances in a reasonable manner;
(6) prevention of deliberate or negligent damage to the premises;
(7) conduct that will not disturb the neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
Noncompliance permits the landlord to give notice of termination
of the rental agreement after at least thirty days. If the noncompliance
is remedied within fourteen days, the rental agreement shall not terminate. Recurrence of substantially the same noncompliance within six
months entitles the landlord to terminate the rental agreement upon at
least fourteen days notice.
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LIMITATIONS ON LANDLORD'S REMEDIES

A.

Distress

Development
At common law, the landlord is entitled, upon the tenant's default
of the rent, to enter the premises and seize or distrain the tenant's
movable property as security for the rent. The modern trend has been
to make distress a statutory remedy whereby the landlord obtains a
distress warrant and an officer of the court acquires possession of the
tenant's property. The statute may provide for judicial sale of this property. The question raised with respect to these statutes is whether the
requirement of procedural due process, as defined in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and its progeny, permit such a
seizure of the tenant's property without notice and a hearing on the issue
of nonpayment of rent.
Leading Cases
Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)-invalidated as
unconstitutional California's Innkeeper's Lien Law, which, in certain types of apartments, permitted distraint of a tenant's movables.
Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970)-held unconstitutional as violative of procedural due process the provision of
Pennsylvania's distress statute permitting the sale of the tenant's
goods without notice or hearing. The statute was invalidated only
as applied to low-income tenants. Accord, Musselman v. Spies,
343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp.
230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972)-held entire Pennsylvania distress statute unconstitutional on its face.
Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971)-held Kentucky
distress statute unconstitutional.
Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971)-held Georgia
distress statute unconstitutional.
Jurisdictions
These statutes permit distraint of a tenant's property:
tit. 25, §§ 5501-27 (Supp. 1970).

DEL. CODE ANN.

GA. CODE ANN.

§§ 61-401 to -407 (1966).
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ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, §§ 16-35 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.040-.068 (Supp. 1972).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2705-09, 3218-19 (West Supp. 1973).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 8-301 to -331 (Supp. 1972).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:33-1 to -23 (Supp. 1972).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-6-5 to -16 (1960).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.302-.313 (1965).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-151 to -165 (1962).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

arts. 5227, 5239 (Supp. 1972).

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-9, -12, -13 (Supp. 1972).

Periodicals
Comments on Klim v. Jones:
49 N.C.L. REV. 763 (1971).
5 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 447 (1971).
28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 481 (1971).
39 U. CIN. L. REV. 815 (1970).

Comments on Santiago v. McElroy:
Note, Landlord's Distraintand JudicialRestraint: A Look at Santiago
v. McElroy, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 564 (1971).
22

CASE

W. RES. L. REV. (1971).

Model Code and Uniform Act
Both the Model Code (section 3-403) and the Uniform Act (section
4.205) abolish the common law right of distress for rent.
B.

Eviction

1. ForcibleEntry and Unlawful Detainer Statutes
a. Exclusivity of Remedy
Development
Early common law permitted a landlord entitled to possession to
regain that possession from the tenant by force. Modern English and
American statutes limit the degree of self-help available to the landlord.
Every state has such a statute regulating forcible entry. In exchange for
this limitation on the landlord's remedies, the statutes provide a summary judicial proceeding that enables the landlord to expeditiously evict
a tenant who has defaulted on the rent or who is unlawfully holding
over.
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The jurisdictions vary as to the degree of self-help permitted as an
alternative to the summary judicial proceeding. The spectrum of permissible self-help ranges from reasonable and necessary force to a requirement that possession be regained in a wholly peaceable manner. The
modern trend, however, is to make the summary proceeding under the
statute the landlord's exclusive remedy, thereby prohibiting any attempt
to dispossess the tenant without resorting to legal process.
Leading Cases
Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488
(1961)-held that despite the right of re-entry clause in the lease
and the absence of actual force or violence in the landlord's entry,
the landlord was guilty of forcible entry and detainer under the
applicable California statute; a landlord may dispossess a tenant
only by means of the summary legal process established in the
statute.
Jurisdictions
These jurisdictions make the summary eviction proceeding the
landlord's exclusive remedy:
ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-1171 to -1172 (1956).
Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488
(1961).
Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (1854).
DEL. CODE ANN. 25:5517 (Supp. 1972).
Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714 (Fla. App. 1964).
Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 22 S.E. 545 (1894).
French v. Willer, 126 Ill. 611, 18 N.E. 811 (1888).
Louisiana Materials Co. v. Cronvich, 236 So. 2d 510 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E. 529 (1890).
Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App. 485, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1951).
Price v. Osborne, 24 Tenn. App. 525, 147 S.W.2d 412 (1940).
Chrone v. Gonzales, 215 S.W. 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935).
Periodicals
Boyer & Gamble, Reform of Landlord-Tenant Statutes to Eliminate
Self-Help in Evicting Tenants, 22 U. MIAMi L. REV. 800
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(1968)-analyzes Florida's decisions and suggests statutory revisions to implement a decisional law prohibition of peaceable, as
well as forcible, landlord self-help. This lengthy article provides
broad treatment of the self-help question and offers specific statutory revisions.
Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern
Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1970)-comprehensively examines summary
eviction procedures, the landlord's cause of action for rent or violation of rules, the tenant's right to a hearing, self-help evictions, the
landlord's power of distraint, and the indigent tenant's right to
representation under the proposed Model Residential LandlordTenant Code (See infra at 704).
Annotations
Statute prescribingdamagesfor forcibly ejecting or excluding one from
possession of real property as applying to possession held by one
as servant or employee, 14 A.L.R. 808 (1921).
Dispossession without legal process by one entitled to possession of
realproperty as ground of action, other thanfor recovery ofpossession or damages to his person, by person dispossessed, 101
A.L.R. 476 (1936).
Right to use force to obtain possession of real property to which one
is entitled, 141 A.L.R. 250 (1942).
Recovery by tenant of damages for physical injury or mental anguish
occasioned by wrongful eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936 (1951).
Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant
without legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966).
Model Code and Uniform Act
See infra at 706.
b.

Limitations on Defenses
Development

Because of the summary nature of the judicial proceeding under
forcible entry and detainer statutes, the litigation concerns only whether
the tenant has defaulted in paying rent and whether he is unlawfully
holding over. This limitation, which restricts the defenses available to
the tenant, is justified by certain theoretical considerations. At common
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law, lease covenants are generally independent. Thus, breach of a covenant by the landlord does not relieve the tenant of the obligation to pay
rent. (But see Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, infra at 718.) Moreover,
modern defenses, such as breach of warranty of habitability as an excuse
for nonpayment of rent (infra at 727) or retaliatory eviction (infra at
707), were previously unknown at common law. Current debate concerns the availability of such defenses in a proceeding under the forcible
entry and detainer statutes and their effect on the summary nature of
the proceeding.
Leading Cases
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)- held, inter alia, that the
provisions of Oregon's forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute,
which restricted the triable issues to the tenant's breach of covenant and
precluded tenant from raising defenses based on the landlord's breaches,
satisfied federal equal protection and due process requirements. The
Court refused to grant housing the status of a "fundmental interest" for
equal protection purposes and found the statute rationally related to the
state's legitimate objective of settling possessory suits rapidly and peaceably. In dismissing the tenants' due process challenge, the Court declined to impose on the states the growing doctrine of dependent rental
agreement covenants.
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 91, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970)-held that a tenant may assert his landlord's retaliatory
rent increase and eviction as a defense in a forcible entry and
detainer action.
Periodicals
Comment, New Tenets in Old Houses: Changing Concepts of Equal
Protection in Lindsey v. Normet, 58 VA. L. REV. 930 (1972)provides a careful analytical critique of the constitutional law basis
of the Lindsey decision.
Comment, Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful DetainerAlternative Approaches, 22
HASTINGS
L.J.
1365
(1971)-comments on Schweiger v. Superior Court and notes that
the case fails to recognize the full significance of permitting the
defense of retaliatory eviction in a forcible entry and detainer action.
Note, Unlawful Detainer: Synopsis of California Law and Constitu-
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tional Considerations,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 768 (1971)-reviews the
conflicting policy and legal arguments proposed by landlords and
tenants in the continuing dispute over the adequacy of summary
dispossessory proceedings in California. Focusing primarily on
constitutional issues and California law, this note analyzes the
arguments and current state of the law regarding the limited defenses available to tenants in forcible entry and detainer proceedings.
25 VAND. L. REV. 654 (1972)-comments on Lindsey v. Normet.
Model Code
The provisions of the Model Code that provide for summary proceedings for possession vary notably in several regards from the law
existing in many states today. These differences include:
(1) The action may be brought not only by landlords or owners,
but also by "the tenant who has been wrongfully put out or kept out"
(section 3-203(3)) and "the next tenant of the premises, whose term has
begun" (section 3-203(4)).
(2) The landlord must show proof of a tenant's default if the
action is based on holding over or breach of covenant to pay rent (section 3-208), and if the landlord brings an action based on default with
regard to the lessee's tenancy, he must demonstrate the necessity and
legitimacy of the obligation (section 3-209).
(3) The tenant may assert all legal and equitable defenses and
counterclaims (section 3-210).
(4) Nonjury trials are strongly recommended (commentary to
section 3-211).
(5) The costs assignable to a tenant who is found to have wrongfully failed to pay rent are limited to 25 dollars. This section is intended
to encourage tenants to pursue their right to setoff of rent as a remedy
to the landlord's failure to make repairs (section 3-212(4) and commentary thereto).
The summary judicial procedure provided by the Code is the landlord's exclusive remedy for recovering possession, and he is liable for
substantial damages for resorting to self-help remedies. Section 2-408.
Uniform Act
The Uniform Act contains no provisions establishing a procedure
for evicting a tenant holding over or in default of rent. Section 4.105
permits the tenant to raise defenses and counterclaims in an action for
possession based on nonpayment of rent or an action for rent.
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Retaliatory Eviction
Development

At common law a landlord may evict a periodic tenant or a tenant
at sufferance for any reason or for no reason, upon service of timely
notice to quit. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer statutes have further
strengthened the landlord's right to control his property by providing
summary eviction procedures which deny the tenant who does not relinquish possession after receiving notice of eviction any opportunity to
raise defenses to the action. See Limitations on Defenses, supra at 704.
Faced with the prospect of summary eviction in retaliation for their
efforts, tenants have been reluctant to seek enforcement of housing and
sanitary code provisions or other legal rights arising under the lease or
the laws of the municipal, state, or federal government. Accordingly, the
effort to eliminate substandard conditions and uninhabitable dwelling
units from the urban housing market has been seriously inhibited. Until
recently, however, courts and legislatures have been reluctant to alter
the traditional landlord-tenant relationship and provide the tenant with
relief from landlord reprisals.
The modern trend permits tenants to raise retaliatory motive as a
defense to an action for eviction brought by the landlord. The courts
have generally justified this defense on two grounds. First, the use of
the state courts to evict a tenant in retaliation for exercising his first
amendment rights of speech and to petition government for redress of
grievances constitutes state action denying the tenant due process in
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. Secondly, public policy and statutory interpretation prohibit reprisals against a tenant who helps enforce housing codes or
asserts other legal rights designed to alleviate the shortage of habitable
housing.
Jurisdictions vary as to what rights are protected from retaliation
and where in the judicial process the defense may be raised. See Limitations on Defenses, supra at 704.
Leading Case
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1968)-upheld the defense of retaliatory eviction asserted by
a tenant evicted for reporting housing code violations. The case
discusses the constitutional implications of the defense, but rests
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its holding on grounds of public policy and interpretation of the
housing code.
Jurisdictions
The following cases have upheld the defense of retaliatory eviction
on constitutional grounds (parentheticals indicate the specific right
protected):
McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) (participation in
tenants' organization; fact that housing was government financed
sufficient to find state action).
Bowles v. Blue Lake Development Corp., [1968-1971 Transfer
12,920 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (complaints
Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
to county zoning and sanitary officials concerning substandard
conditions in mobile park and the failure of the landlord to comply
with the plot plan).
E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544
(1971) (participation in tenants' organization); Engler v. Capital
Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615 (1970)
(participation in tenants' organization); State v. Field, 107 N.J.
Super. 107, 257 A.2d 127 (1969) (reporting violations of health and
housing codes to officials).
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(organizing tenants' union); Tarver v. G.C. Construction Corp.,
No. 64-2945 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1964) (reprinted in E. JARMEL,
PROBLEMS

IN

THE

LEGAL

REPRESENTATION

OF

THE

§ 12.08, at 12-203 (1972)) (reporting housing code violations); Church v. Allen Meadows Apartments, 69 Misc. 2d 254,
329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (participation in tenants' organization). But see Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (institution of state court eviction proceeding in
retaliation for tenant's organizing activities does not constitute
state action violating tenant's first and fourteenth amendment
rights).
Bergdoll v. McKinney, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L.
11,360 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (reporting housing code violations).
REP.
POOR

The following cases have upheld the defense of retaliatory eviction
on grounds of public policy and statutory interpretation:
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970) (tenant exercising statutory repair and deduct remedy
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protected against retaliatory rent increase or eviction).
F. W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 41 U.S.L.W. 2303 (D.C. Super.
Ct., Nov. 21, 1972) (class action challenging retaliatory rent increases); Robinson v. DiamondHousing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (extended the holding in Edwards v. Habib to protect
from retaliatory eviction a tenant who successfully asserted her
legal defenses in a prior eviction proceeding); Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reporting housing code violations).
Riley v. Willette, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
12,263 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1968) (complaining to landlord about
electrical wiring defect); Watts v. Lyles, [1968-1971 Transfer
9,028 (Mich. Cir. Commissioners
Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
Ct. 1968) (reporting housing code violations).
Botko v. Cooper, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
1 11,549 (Minn. Mun. Ct. 1970) (reporting housing code violations).
State v. Field, 107 N.J. Super. 107, 257 A.2d 127 (1969) (upheld as
permissible exercise of police power a state statute proscribing
retaliatory eviction for reporting health and housing code violations); see also Alexander Hamilton Savings and Loan Assn. v.
Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Dist. Ct. 1969) (held that
statute prohibits retaliatory eviction for reporting violations of any
ordinance, law, or regulation that has as its objective the regulation
of rental premises).
Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972) (reporting housing code violations; since summary eviction proceeding is in derogation of common law, the statute must be strictly
construed against the landlord); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d
1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968) (reporting
housing code violations; defense equitable in nature).
Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970) (reporting housing
code violations; court found that retaliation was sole purpose for
the eviction).
In the following cases, the tenant failed to assert successfully the
defense of retaliatory eviction:
LaChance v. Hoyt, 6 Conn. Cir. 207, 269 A.2d 303 (1969).
Wilson v. John R. Pinkett, Inc., 265 A.2d 778 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
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Wheeler Terrace v. Sylvester, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder) CCH
Pov. L. REP.
10,371 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969).
Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So.2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Evans v. Rose, CCH Pov. L. REP.
2325.06 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
Motoda v. Donohoe, 1 Wash. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654 (1969).
The following statutes and administrative provisions establish the
defense of retaliatory eviction and generally create a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory motive for an eviction sought within a specified
period after the tenant has asserted a protected right:
Dept. of Treasury, IRS, Price Commission Rulings 1972-204, -205,
Cost of Living Council Rulings 1972-74, -75, 37 Fed. Reg. 13648
(July 12, 1972) (protects tenant against retaliation for reporting
illegal rent increases to the IRS or for his exercise of any other
rights under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. Law
No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1973).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-375a (Supp. 1971).
DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 25, § 5516 (Supp. 1972).

Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia § 2910 (amended,
June 12, 1970) (reprinted in Indritz, The Tenants' Rights
Movement, 1 NEW MExico L. REV. 1, 139 (1971)).
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 666-43 (Supp. 1972).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1973).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18, ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1972), as
amended, arts. 1972, ch. 99, §§ 1, 2.
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.5646(4),(5) (Supp. 1972).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp. 1973).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:13-a, -b (Supp. 1972).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10, .11, .12 (Supp. 1973).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8590, 8609 (McKinney Supp.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1973).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-20-10 to -11 (1969).
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Periodicals
Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the Slumlord: Interactions of New
Remedies and Old Buildings in Housing Code Enforcement, 3
URBAN LAW 609, 618 (1971)-argues for extending the protection
against retaliatory rent increases and evictions currently available
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to tenants reporting housing code violations to cover tenant organizing and collective bargaining.
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966)-studies problems associated with
housing code enforcement, including the inadequacy of the criminal sanctions, and recommends a new civil remedy that may be
more appropriately tailored to the violation.
Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California:A Study in Frustration,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1970)-suggests that the ineffectiveness of
current tenants' remedies demands broad reformation, including
(a) modified unlawful detainer procedures providing the tenant
with a hearing, adequate time to prepare for trial, and the right to
offer counterclaims and cross-complaints relating to the lessor's
performance of his duties; (b) limitation of landlord's lien and
execution on an unlawful detainer judgment; (c) the expansion and
clarification of California's repair and deduct remedy; (d) new
remedies, including explicit statutory warranties of habitability,
more extensive code enforcement provisions, and damages for
breach of landlord's obligations; (e) statutory proscription of retaliatory evictions or rent increases, including a prescribed time period following the tenant's exercise of any protected activity during
which any eviction or rent increase would be prima facie retaliatory.
McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants, and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. REV. 193 (1969)-argues that current legislative
and judicial approaches to the problem of retaliatory eviction are
ineffective in attacking slum housing.
Moskovitz, Retaliatory Eviction-A New Doctrine in California, 46
CAL.

STATE

BAR

J. 23 (1971)-analyzes California's anti-

retaliatory eviction statute. The study traces legislative, judicial,
and constitutional origins and bases of the defense and suggests
that evidentiary problems may be solved by analogy to labor relations situations.
Moskovitz, Retaliatory Eviction-The Law and the Facts, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4 (1969)-offers a general survey of developments
and discusses legislative and judicial approaches and applications
to practice.
Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two
Approaches, 54 CAL. L. REV. 670 (1966)-contends that although
judicial reliance both on the implied affirmative obligations im-
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posed upon the landlord and on the doctrine of substantial performance have provided some relief for the indigent faced with
substandard housing, a significant adjustment of the landlordtenant relationship facing the urban poor may be realized only if
judicial efforts are supplemented by a uniform statutory. lease that
would secure for the indigent tenant the legal incidents of leaseholding.
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change,
54 GEO. L.J. 519, 541-42 (1966)-proposes alternative bases for
the defense of retaliatory eviction, including (a) violation of the
first amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, (b) violation of the constitutional right of citizens to
report violations of laws to the authorities, (c) common law tort
of abuse of process, or (d) prima facie tort.
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A CriticalEvaluation
of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
225 (1969)-argues that the development of the concept of a lease
from a conveyance of an interest in land to a primarily contractual
arrangement requires a reevaluation of the landlord-tenant relationship, including the recognition of implied warranties and viable
tenants' remedies.
Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL
PROP. PROB. AND TRUST

J. 550 (1971)-surveys recent develop-

ments including the defense of retaliatory eviction and its treatment in the Model Code (see infra, at 715).
Note, Emerging LandlordLiability: A JudicialReevaluation of Tenant
Remedies, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 387 (1971)-discusses the landlord's increased liability for safety and habitability reflected in the
establishment of new tenant remedies by legislative and judicial
action.
Comment, Tenant's Remedies in the District of Columbia: New Hope
for Reform, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 80 (1968)-argues that while
Edwards v. Habib has made the landlord's retaliatory motive a
theoretical defense to summary eviction, the trial courts must
make it effective by drawing from circumstantial evidence or presumptions reasonable inferences regarding the landlord's motives.
Note, The Use of the Federal Remedy to Bar RetaliatoryEviction, 39
U. CIN. L. REV. 712 (1970)-observes that recourse to the federal
courts provides the tenant with an additional weapon against retaliatory eviction when state remedies fail to protect him.
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Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-JudicialReinforcement
of the Housing Code, 56 GEO. L. REV. 920, 933-36
(1968)-contends that a ban on the landlord's retaliatory acts is
required for the effective operation of the illegal contract defense.
Note, Retaliatory Eviction and the Reporting of Housing Code Violations in the District of Columbia, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 190
(1967)-examines sections 1250 and 1251 of proposed H.R. 257,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which generally prohibited eviction
of a tenant for nine months following the tenant's report of housing
code violations.
Note, California Unlawful Detainer Procedure-A Proposed Legislative Change, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 491 (1970)-attacks the current
unlawful detainer procedure as failing to serve the requirements of
the tenant in that (a) affirmative defenses and counterclaims are
usually not allowed, (b) no exemption of the tenant's property
remaining in the premises from seizure and storage is provided, (c)
service of process is inconsistent, and the time to prepare an effective response is inadequate, and (d) a writ of possession may issue
in favor of the landlord prior to the unlawful detainer action.
Note, Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer-Alternative Approaches?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1365 (1971)-discusses
the conjunction between California's retaliatory eviction statute
and emerging judicial remedies (e.g., Schweiger v. Superior Court)
that give the tenant a broad retaliatory eviction defense.
Comment, Recent Developments in Illinois Landlord-Tenant Law,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 589, 594-critizes the Illinois retaliatory eviction
statute because it prohibits retaliatory eviction, but fails to prescribe penalties for violators or prohibit retaliatory rent increases.
Note, Retaliatory Eviction in California: The Legislature Slams the
Door and Boards up the Windows, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 118
(1972)-observes that the California statute deliberately places
only minimal restrictions on retaliatory evictions and affords the
tenant his exclusive remedy against landlord reprisals;
additionally, the tenant is protected from retaliation only for specified acts and only within sixty days of their occurrence.
Note, Retaliatory Eviction: A Study of Existing Law and Proposed
Model Code, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537 (1969)-contends that
by clearly defining the landlord-tenant relationship in regard to
retaliatory eviction, by proscribing retaliatory rent increases as
well as retaliatory evictions, and by providing treble damages
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against the offending landlord, the ABF's Model Residential
Landlord-Tenant Code, see infra, at 715, more effectively serves
the goal of achieving higher quality housing than do current legislative and judicial attacks on retaliatory eviction.

20

BUFFALO

L.

REV.

317 (1970)-comments on State v. Field, re-

states the theories on which courts have relied in the absence of
statutes to support the defense of retaliatory eviction, and urges
other state legislatures to protect tenants from landlord reprisals.
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 592 (1971)-comments on Schweiger v.
Superior Court. The author argues that the court erred in placing
the burden of proving the retaliatory motive on the tenant because
(1) the burden is inconsistent with the public policy of enabling
tenants to receive full benefit of housing statutes, (2) it ignores the
fact that the landlord is in a better position to inform the court of
his motivations, and (3) it is inconsistent with the Model Code and
recent statutes that impose a presumption of retaliation if the landlord's action occurs within a specific time following the tenant's
complaint or repairs.
1971 WISCONSIN L. REV. 939-comments on Dickhut v. Norton. The
author suggests that the strict burden of proof placed on the tenant,
requiring him to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
a condition existed which in fact violated the housing code, that the
landlord knew that the tenant had reported the condition to the
enforcement authority, and that the landlord sought to terminate
the tenancy for the sole purpose of retaliation, may render the
defense of retaliatory eviction meaningless.
Comments on Edwards v. Habib:

23

ARK. L. REV. 122 (1969).
HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB.

L. REV. 193 (1967)-comments on
the lower court opinion (227 A.2d 388 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967))
that rejected the retaliatory eviction defense. The comment suggests several bases that support the tenant's position, including
constitutional theories, public policy considerations, abuse of right,
abuse of process, and prima facie tort.
82 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1969)-approves the result, but questions the
court's first and fourteenth amendment analysis and suggests that
the landlord's interest in the management of his property may be
more substantial than the court allows. Furthermore, the Comment argues, permitting a private party's mere invocation of the
3
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aid of the court to constitute state action transforms traditionally
private concerns into public matters and goes beyond the intent of
the framers of the Constitution.
48 NEB. L. REV. 1101 (1969).
44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 410 (1969).
44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 286 (1968)-predicts only limited acceptance
of the defense.
Annotations
Landlord's retaliatorymotive provides tenant with defense to summary
procedures, CCH Pov. L. REP.
2325 (1972).
Retaliatory eviction of tenantfor reportinglandlord's violation of law,
40 A.L.R.3d 753 (1971).
Model Code
Subject to certain limited "fairness" exceptions, section 2-407 protects a tenant not in default of rent from eviction, increase in rent, or
decrease in services for six months after he has, in good faith, reported
housing or sanitary code violations to the body charged with enforcement of such codes, or such body has filed a notice or complaint of such
violation, or the tenant has, in good faith, requested repairs. A tenant
who has been unlawfully evicted in violation of this section is entitled
to three months rent or treble damages, whichever is greater, plus the
cost of suit and reasonable attorney's fees.
Uniform Act
Under section 5.101, eviction is proscribed if in retaliation for reporting housing or building code violations, for complaining to the landlord of a violation of section 2.104 (Landlord's duty to maintain the
premises), or for organizing or becoming a member of a tenants' organization. Evidence of a complaint within one year of the alleged act of
retaliation raises a presumption of retaliatory motive unless the complaint was made after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution
of services.
Notwithstanding any of the above, a landlord may evict a tenant
if the tenant is responsible for the code violation, is in default of rent,
or if compliance with the code requires alteration, remodeling, or demolition which would effectively deprive the tenant of the use of the premises.
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In addition to serving as a defense in an action for eviction, a
landlord's retaliatory conduct entitles the tenant under section 4.107 to
treble damages or an amount equal to three months rent, whichever is
greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees.

IV.

TENANT'S RIGHTS

A.

Contract

1. Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages-Abandonment
Development
Abandonment occurs when a tenant relinquishes possession of the
rented premises and ceases to pay rent as it falls due. This situation may
be viewed as an offer by the tenant to surrender the duration of his estate
to the landlord. If the offer is accepted by the landlord, then the estate
and rental agreement is terminated. In the absence of a valid surrender,
the jurisdictions are split as to the rights of the parties. The conflict
turns on the characterization of the rental agreement as a conveyance
of an estate or as a contract. Under the conveyance view, as long as the
landlord does not interfere with the tenant's possession (see Quiet Enjoyment, infra at 718), the tenant is obligated to pay rent whether or
not he remains in physical possession of the premises. Accordingly, the
landlord is under no obligation, in the event of an abandonment, to seek
a new tenant and thereby mitigate the original tenant's damages. The
contract view, however, in accord with general contract theory, places
on the landlord such a duty to exercise a reasonable effort to mitigate
the tenant's damages.
Leading Cases
Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965)-adopted the
rule that the landlord must make a reasonable effort to mitigate
an abandoning tenant's damages. This case offers an excellent
analysis of the relevant issues.
Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968)-held that a
showing of diligence in reletting the abandoned premises is an
essential element of plaintiff-landlord's cause of action, which
plaintiff must, therefore, plead and prove.
Jurisdictions
The following jurisdictions expressly or by implication recognize
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the rule that a landlord must make a reasonable effort to mitigate the
abandoning tenant's damages:
Hinde v. Madansky, 161 Ill. App. 216 (1911). Contra, Rau v. Baker,
118 Ill. App. 150 (1905).
Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968); Friedman v.
Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945).
Gordon v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 195 Kan. 341, 404 P.2d 949
(1965); Lawson v. Callaway, 131 Kan. 789, 293 P. 503 (1930).
Fox v. Roethlisberger, 350 Mich. 1, 85 N.W.2d 73 (1957).
Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929).
Weinstein v. Griffin, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549 (1954).
Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965).
United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d
403 (1956).
Meyer v. Evans, 16 Utah 2d 56, 395 P.2d 726 (1964).
Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 212 P. 1057 (1923). Contra, California Bldg. Co. v. Drury, 103 Wash. 577, 175 P. 302 (1918).
St. Regis Apartment Corp. v. Sweitzer, 32 Wis. 2d 426, 145 N.W.2d
711 (1966).
Annotations
When landlord'sreletting or efforts to relet after tenant's abandonment
or refusal to enter deemed to be acceptance ofsurrender,3 A.L.R.
1080 (1919),supplementedby 52 A.L.R. 154 (1928), 61 A.L.R. 773
(1929), 110 A.L.R. 368 (1937).
Model Code
A tenant who abandons the premises is liable under section 2308(4) for the entire rent or the difference between the rent and the fair
rental value, whichever is less. If the tenant is liable for the latter
amount, he must also pay all rent accrued during the period reasonably
necessary to re-rent the premises plus a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises.
Uniform Act
Under section 4.203(c), the landlord is obligated to make reasonable efforts to re-rent abaondoned premises at a fair rental. Failure to
do so, or acceptance of the abandonment as a surrender, terminates
the rental agreement as of the date the landlord has notice of the
abandonment.
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Quiet Enjoyment
a. Possession
Development

Ordinarily, the lessee has a right to take possession of the property
on the date fixed in the lease. The lessor has a corresponding implied
obligation to deliver possession of the demised premises to the lessee at
the beginning of the term. The general rule is that the ordinary lease
raises an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment of the leased premises to
which the lessor, one claiming under him, or one asserting paramount
title is bound. This covenant is breached if possession is withheld from
the lessee. Thus, all authorities agree that if a prior tenant rightfully
remains on the premises past the date fixed for the commencement of
the new tenancy, the lessor will be liable to the second lessee for a breach
of the implied covenant.
The landlord, however, assures the tenant of quiet possession only
as against all who rightfully claim through or under the landlord. After
the date of delivery, the lessor has no duty to protect his lessee against
trespassers. If a former tenant wrongfully holds over or a trespasser is
on the land on the date the new lessee is to take possession, the issue is
whether the landlord has a duty, in the absence of an express covenant,
to put the tenant in actual possession of the demised premises.
The English rule, followed by a majority of American jurisdictions,
implies a covenant requiring the lessor to put the lessee in actual possession of the premises on the first day of the term. Under the English rule,
this covenant is included within the covenant of quiet enjoyment. If the
lessee is prevented from obtaining possession by someone holding over,
whether rightfully or wrongfully, then the covenant is violated, and the
lessee is entitled to recover damages from the lessor. The lessee, without
agreement to the contrary, is under no duty to oust the tenant who
wrongfully holds over; this duty falls upon the lessor.
Under the American rule, to which a minority of jurisdictions subscribe, the implied covenant to deliver possession is merely a corollary
to the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The landlord is not bound to put
the tenant into actual possession, but is bound only to put him into legal
possession so that no superior right to possession will preclude his taking actual possession. The tenant, then, assumes the burden of enforcing
his right of possession against all persons wrongfully in possession.
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Therefore, the new tenant's remedy lies against the person wrongfully
in possession and not against the landlord.
Neither rule applies in the case of the parties that have expressly
convenanted otherwise. Under both rules, the covenant to deliver possession is breached when the lessee is prevented from taking possession
by acts of the lessor, or when the lessor fails to deliver a valid legal right
to possession.
Failure of the lessor to give the required possession gives rise to an
action for damages for breach of an express or implied covenant to give
possession, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and/or anticipatory breach of the lease.
Leading Cases
King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880)-adopted the English rule;
illustrates the rationale behind the rule, that one who accepts a
lease expects to enjoy the property, not acquire a lawsuit.
Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930)-adopted the
American rule; the court examined both rules and concluded that
since the lessee has the right under Virginia statutes to bring a
summary action for unlawful detainer against a tenant holding
over, and since the lessor had conveyed his possession, the tenant
is the proper party to bring this action.
Jurisdictions
The following jurisdictions adhere to the English rule:
King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880).
Chesire v. Thurston, 70 Ariz. 299, 219 P.2d 1043 (1950). But see
Taylor v. Stanford, 100 Ariz. 346, 414 P.2d 727 (1966).
Williams v. Petty, 168 Ark. 642, 271 S.W. 9 (1925); Thomas v. Croom,
102 Ark. 108, 143 S.W. 88 (1912).
Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn. 480, 18 A. 595 (1889).
Baxley v. Davenport, 75 Ga. App. 659, 44 S.E.2d 388 (1947); see also,
Kokomo Rubber Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S.E. 783
(1924).
Taylor v. Phelan, 69 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1946); Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Joyce, 54 Ind. App. 658, 103 N.E. 354
(1913).
Dilly v. Paynesville Land Co., 173 Iowa 536, 155 N.W. 971 (1916).
Stewart v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609 (1915).
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Mattingly's Executor v. Brents, 155 Ky. 570, 159 S.W. 1157 (1913).
Mullins v. Brown, 87 Ohio App. 427, 94 N.E.2d 574 (1950).
Herpolsheimerv. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 111 N.W. 359 (1907).
Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936).
Barfield v. Damon, 56 N.M. 515, 245 P.2d 1032 (1952).

N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223a (McKinney 1968).
Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 208 Okla. 163, 254 P.2d 346 (1952).
Obermeier v. Mattison, 98 Ore. 195, 192 P. 283 (1920).
Bloch v. Busch, 160 Tenn. 21, 22 S.W.2d 242 (1929).
Whitfield v. Gay, 253 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
Huntington Easy Payment Co. v. Parsons, 62 W. Va. 26, 57 S.E. 253
(1907).
Shreiner v. Stanton, 26 Wash. 563 (1901).
Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314 (1904).
The following jurisdictions follow the American rule:
Playter v. Cunningham, 21 Cal. 229 (1862); Lost Key Mines v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d 569, 241 P.2d 273 (1952).
Judd v. Ladd, I Hawaii 17 (1847).
People v. Mattingly, 106 Ill. App. 2d 74, 245 N.E.2d 647 (1969);
Gazzolo v. Chambers, 73 Ill. 75 (1874).
Rice v. Biltmore, 141 Md. 507, 119 A. 364 (1922).
Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 N.E. 69 (1924).
Ward v. Hudson, 199 Miss. 171, 24 So. 2d 329 (1946).
Pendergast v. Young, 21 N.H. 234 (1850).
Cozens v. Stevenson, 5 S. & R. 421 (Pa. 1819). But see Dougherty v.
Thomson, 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219 (1933) (dictum supporting the
view that there is an implied covenant of the lessor regarding the
delivery of possession); Rice v. McGarvey, 70 Pitts. Leg. J. 1055
(Pa. C.P. 1922) (falls somewhere between English and American
rule).
Underwood v. Birchard, 47 Vt. 305 (1875).
Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
Model Code
Under section 2-202, failure of the landlord to put the tenant in
possession entitles the tenant to give notice of termination of the rental
agreement and, if inability to enter is caused wrongfully by the landlord,
to expenses reasonably necessary to obtain adequate substitute housing
for one month in an amount of up to one-half of the agreed monthly
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rent. If inability to enter results from a prior tenant's wrongful holdingover, the tenant may maintain a summary proceeding for possession
against the occupant and recover from the landlord the expenses of such
proceeding, reasonable attorney's fees, and substitute housing expenses.
Uniform Act
Section 2.103 places upon the landlord the duty to deliver possession of the premises. The landlord is authorized to bring an action for
possession against any person wrongfully in possession, and he may
recover damages in the amount of not more than three months' rent or
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's
fees. Breach of the landlord's obligation to deliver possession abates the
new tenant's rent until possession is delivered. Section 4.102. Moreover,
the tenant is entitled under section 4.102 to demand performance of the
rental agreement and maintain an action for possession and damages
against the landlord and anyone wrongfully in possession. Breach of the
landlord's obligation that is willful and not in good faith entitles the
tenant to damages in the amount of not more than three months' periodic rent or treble actual damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable
attorney's fees.
b.

Eviction

Development
At common law, every rental agreement contains an implied covenant that neither the landlord nor anyone acting through him or under
claim of paramount title will materially interfere with the tenant's possession of the leased premises. Breach of this covenant of quiet enjoyment gives the tenant an action for damages and relieves him of the duty
to pay rent. This result represents a notable exception to the traditional
rule that lease covenants are independent.
Because possession is the key element protected by the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, breach of the covenant requires an act by the landlord,
or his failure to perform an act that he has a duty to perform, that so
interferes with the tenant's possessory interests that the tenant's occupation of the premises is precluded. (The act may also prevent him from
obtainingpossession. See Quiet Enjoyment: Possession, supra at 718).
Any actual, unlawful eviction of the tenant from the leasehold,
therefore, constitutes a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. By
analogy, a breach occurs when there is a constructive eviction. Here,
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although the landlord does not physically evict the tenant, he does create
or permits to be created a condition that so interferes with the tenant's
enjoyment and occupation of the premises that the tenant is forced to
abandon-as when the landlord permits another part of the premises to
be used for prostitution or, more recently, allows the condition of an
urban residential dwelling to so deteriorate that the building becomes
uninhabitable.
Actual eviction from just a portion of the demised premises has
been held to relieve the tenant of his entire rental obligation on the
theory that the landlord cannot apportion his wrong. The courts have
been reluctant to accept the analogous theory of partial constructive
eviction and permit the tenant who removes from only part of the
premises to retain possession of the remainder while claiming release
from, or reduction of, his rent payments.
Recognizing the harshness of the requirement of abandonment of
the premises in the context of an urban housing shortage, some courts
have found a constructive eviction even when the tenant remains in
possession.
Leading Cases
Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1946)-apparently recognized constructive eviction without abandonment, but emphasized that the tenant had abandoned a portion
of the premises. However, the current law in New York rejects the
theory of constructive eviction without abandonment. Barash v.
Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256
N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970), reversing 31 App. Div. 342,
298 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1969); Gombo v. Martise,44 Misc. 2d 239, 253
N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. T.), reversingper curiam 41 Misc. 2d 475,246
N.Y.S.2d 750 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
East Haven Associates, Inc. v. Gurian, 64 Misc.2d 276, 313 N.Y.S.
2d 927 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970)-recognized partial constructive eviction. Contra, Zweighaft v. Remington, 66 Misc.2d 261, 320
N.Y.S.2d 151 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971)-refused to follow the theory
of partial constructive eviction on facts identical to those in East
Haven.
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969)extended the doctrine of constructive eviction to latent conditions
existing prior to the execution of the lease. Landlord's breach of
his implied warranty of habitability (see infra at 727) forced ten-
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ant to vacate the premises and supported tenant's claim of constructive eviction.
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969)-rejected the
doctrine of constructive eviction in favor of the theory of breach
of warranty of habitability on grounds of public policy and the
contractual nature of a lease. See Habitability: Implied Warranty,
infra at 727.
Periodicals
Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract
(Damages for Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of
Covenants), 16 TEXAS L. REV. 47, 65-67 (1937)-characterizes
constructive eviction as a fiction developed by the courts to circumvent the common law's refusal to recognize dependent covenants.
Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, 1 NEW MExico L. REV. 1,
78-82 (1971)-summarizes cases and problems.
Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California:A Study in Frustration,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 304-05 (1970)-argues that since the housing shortage precludes abandonment, the courts should recognize
that the failure to abandon within a reasonable time no longer
represents a waiver of the landlord's breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment. Courts should permit tenants to assert partial
constructive eviction and assert rights accruing under a breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment without requiring compliance with
the abandonment doctrine of constructive eviction.
Quinn & Phillips, The Law o] Landlord-Tenant:A CriticalEvaluation
of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
225, 231-39 (1969)-asserts that the doctrine of partial constructive eviction recognizes that in the modern urban setting possession
is no longer the entire consideration for the rent and makes the
tenant's rent obligation dependent on the landlord's performance
of both his service covenants and his covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United
States, I DE PAUL L. REV. 69 (1951)-recognizes that constructive
eviction is based on the theory that a serious interference with the
beneficial enjoyment of the incident of possession effects the same
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment as physical expulsion.
The scope of the remedy has expanded to provide relief when the
landlord has failed to maintain habitability of the premises.
Rapacz, Theories of Defense When Tenants Abandon the Premises
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Because of the Condition Thereof, 4 DE PAUL L. REV. 173
(1954)- offers alternative theories supporting the tenant's abandonment: failure of consideration; doctrine of dependent covenants; "general intent of the parties"; failure to perform conditions
precedent; fraudulent concealment and representation; nuisance;
and the intolerable conditions doctrine.
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change,
54 GEO. L.J. 519, 529-34 (1966)-contends that the housing shortage prevents the abandonment prerequisite to reliance on strict
constructive eviction. Courts should recognize the emerging doctrines of constructive eviction without abandonment, partial constructive eviction, and equitable constructive eviction to provide
relief for the indigent tenant faced with uninhabitable premises.
Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New
York's Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 572, 576-78
(1966)-advocates a merger of partial eviction and constructive
eviction. Considered independently, neither the doctrine of partial
eviction, with its unlikely fact situation, nor the doctrine of constructive eviction, with its abandonment requirement, offers much
assistance to slum dwellers faced with substandard housing. If the
courts recognize that the tenant deprived of essential services is
damaged as severely as the tenant actually ousted from a small
portion of the premises, they may merge the doctrines and permit
the tenant to remain rent-free until the landlord has remedied the
situation.
Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 550, 557-63 (1971)-contends that the
Model Code remedies (see infra at 726), which attempt to create
a right similar to constructive eviction, provide at best a stop-gap
repair-and-deduct procedure that precipitates retaliatory eviction.
Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CAL. L. REV. 304 (1965)-criticizes the abandonment
requirement, which, although feasible for large commercial tenants
with substantial financial leverage, leaves constructive eviction an
illusory alternative for the slum tenant. The theory implicit in the
rejected doctrine of constructive eviction without abandonment,
that a tenant should not be required to pay rent while his apartment remains in a dangerous or unhealthy condition, is recognized
in the rent withholding statutes.
Note, PartialConstructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the
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Tenant's Strugglefor Habitability,21 HASTINGS L.J. 417 (1970)argues that a synthesis of the doctrines of constructive eviction and
partial eviction, permitting the total and automatic suspension of
rent, independent of removal, following a landlord's material interference with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises, would
guarantee either adequate living conditions or effective legal alternatives and would force the landlord to repair despite any common
law leniency or statutory waiver.
Note, Landlord's Lament: New Tenant Remedies in Florida, 24 U.
FLA. L. REV. 769, 771 (1972)-criticizes the abandonment requirement and proposes that the application of the doctrine of public
nuisance to landlord-tenant law now provides the best remedy for
tenants facing substandard housing conditions.
Note, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine of Constructive Eviction,
1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 461-notes that with its risks of determining
material interference and reasonable time, the lack of any place to
go, and the disparity of bargaining power between landlord and
tenant that prevents the tenant from bargaining for rent-free occupation until defects are corrected, the abandonment requirement
leaves constructive eviction an empty remedy for the indigent or
low-income tenant. Legislative remedies, including housing codes,
repair-and-deduct statutes, receivership, and rent withholding are
needed to successfully attack the problems of slum housing and to
provide the tenant with adequate remedies to force improvement
of conditions.
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 818 (1970)-comments on Lemle v. Breeden.
32 U. PITT. L. REV. 228 (1971)-comments on East Haven Associates,
Inc. v. Gurian.
31 U. PITT. L. REV. 138 (1969)-comments critically on Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper: the court's expansion of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment to include an implied warranty of habitability, to permit
a tenant to rely on constructive eviction to gain rescission where
the uninhabitable condition antedates the lease, and to further
erode the caveat emptor doctrine is not supported by the case law
on which the court stands.
Annotations
Acts of insurance company or public authorities to protect property
afterfire as constructive eviction of tenant, 29 A.L.R. 1361 (1924).
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Acts of other tenants as chargeable to landlord, 38 A.L.R. 250 (1925),
supplemented by 45 A.L.R. 1126 (1926), 58 A.L.R. 1049 (1929).
Failure of landlord to make, or permit tenant to make, repairs or alterations requiredby public authority as constructive eviction, 63
A.L.R. 432 (1929).
What amounts to constructive eviction which will support action for
breach of covenant of warranty orfor quiet enjoyment, 172 A.L.R.
18 (1948).
Tenant's or subtenant's right to damages for claimed constructive
eviction or breach of covenant based upon notice to tenant to
vacate or other termination notice, 14 A.L.R.2d 1450 (1950).
Breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment in lease, 41 A.L.R.2d 1414
(1955).
Implied covenant or obligation of lessor to furnish water or water
supply for business needs of lessee, 65 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1959).
Time within which tenant must yield or abandon premises after claimed
constructive eviction, 91 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963).
Infestation of leased dwellings or apartment with vermin as entitling
tenant to abandonpremises or as constructive eviction by landlord,
in absence of express covenant of habitability, 27 A.L.R.3d 924
(1969).
Constructive eviction based on flooding, dampness, or the like, 33
A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970).
2330 (1972).
Constructive Eviction, CCH Pov. L. REP.
Treatises

1 AMERICAN LAW OF
2 R. POWELL, REAL

PROPERTY
PROPERTY

§ 3.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
230[3] (1971)-concludes that the

housing shortage, which precludes the tenant's abandonment, has
severely limited the utility of constructive eviction as a weapon for
the tenant to force the landlord to fulfill his obligations.
J. RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 920-47 (1971).
Model Code
Section 2-205 expands the concept of quiet enjoyment to include
conditions that deprive the tenant of a substantial part of the benefit of
the premises without requiring abandonment. The landlord must be
given written notice of the condition and one week to correct it before
the lease may be terminated, unless the dwelling is uninhabitable or
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unsafe. Willful or negligent acts by the landlord give the tenant an
action for damages, including reasonable costs of securing adequate
substitute housing.
Section 2-206 gives the tenant a limited repair and deduct remedy
for minor defects. See infra at 740.
Where the landlord fails to provide hot water and the building is
equipped for that purpose, the tenant may terminate the lease or abate
one-fourth of the rent. Where the landlord fails to provide heat or a
reasonable amount of water, the tenant may terminate the lease or abate
the rent and procure adequate substitute housing. The landlord is liable
for any additional expenses incurred by the tenant up to one-half of the
actual rent. Section 2-207
Where enjoyment is impaired by fire or other casualty not caused
by the tenant, he may terminate the lease or, when continued possession
is lawful, vacate any part of the premises rendered unusable and be
liable for rent no greater than the fair market value of the portion he
continues to occupy. Section 2-208.
Uniform Act
Under Sections 4.104 and 4.107, willful ouster or diminution of
services by the landlord entitles the tenant to recover possession or
terminate the rental agreement. Moreover, the tenant may recover an
amount equal to treble damages or three months rent, whichever is
greater, and reasonable attorney's fees. If the rental agreement is terminated, the tenant is entitled to the security recoverable under section
2.101 and to all prepaid rent. Cf. Uniform Act provisions for warranty
of habitability, infra at 743.
3.

Habitability

a. Implied Warranty
Development
The common law traditionally recognized no implied warranty of
habitability, warranty of fitness for intended use, or warranty to repair
on the part of the landlord in a lease of real property. Because the
leasehold was considered an interest in the realty for a term during
which the tenant assumed all benefits, obligations, and liabilities of
ownership, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied, and the tenant accepted the property as he found it at the inception of the lease. Moreover, the tenant's obligation for rent was dependent solely on his posses-
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sory interest in the real estate, and the landlord's breach of any express
covenant for services included in the lease gave the tenant only an
independent action for breach of contract. Unless the landlord materially interfered with his possession, the tenant could neither abandon nor
suspend his rental payments. See Quiet Enjoyment: Eviction, supra at
721.
The modern urban tenant, however, seeks not merely possession,
but habitable possession, and the law has struggled to satisfy his expectations. The judicial doctrine of constructive eviction, with its inflexible
abandonment requirement, offers little relief to the tenant faced with the
current housing shortage. See Quiet Enjoyment: Eviction, supra at
721. Similarly, the "furnished dwelling" exception, which has held the
landlord liable for the condition of a furnished dwelling leased for a
short term, fails to address the problems of the low-income tenant.
Furthermore, the municipal housing and sanitation codes, which impose
affirmative repair and maintenance obligations on landlords, often provide only criminal sanctions and have been generally ineffective in their
application. Additionally, while courts have increasingly recognized the
contractual nature of modern leases, many jurisdictions have extended
dependent construction only to express covenants.
Recognizing the need to provide effective, flexible remedies to combat the problems of substandard urban dwellings, some jurisdictions
have recently developed the theory of an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for purpose.
Leading Cases

Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961)-held that
where the premises were in severe disrepair and evidenced substantial housing code violations, a tenant-defendant in his landlord's
action for rent was liable only for the reasonable rental value
during the time of actual occupancy; the landlord's implied warranty of habitability and the tenant's covenant to pay rent are
mutually dependent.
Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968)-

declared lease void and unenforceable where substantial housing
code violations existed at the inception of the lease. Essentially an
application of the illegal contract theory, this defense is available
to defeat a landlord's action for possession for nonpayment of rent.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)-held that a warranty of habitability,
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measured by standards of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations, is implied by law in leases of urban dwelling units covered
by those regulations. The warranty covers both violations existing
at the inception of the lease and those arising during the term.
Remedies for a landlord's breach of this warranty include damages, rescission, and reformation.
Mariniv. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970)-found a warranty
of habitability implied in the language of a lease expressly limited
to use as a dwelling. The warranty applies to latent defects existing
at the inception of the lease or conditions arising during the term.
The landlord's breach entitles the tenant to repair and deduct.
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969)held that breach of an implied warranty of habitability resulting
in the tenant's vacation of the business premises supports the tenant's claim of constructive eviction.
Leinle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969)-rejected the
doctrine of constructive eviction in favor of the theory of breach
of warranty of habitability on grounds of public policy and the
contractual nature of leases.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)-upheld the constitutionality
of that portion of Oregon's forcible entry and wrongful detainer
statute that denies tenants the right to assert the defense of breach
of warranty of habitability at the summary eviction proceeding.
Jurisdictions
The following jurisdictions have recognized in their case law an
implied warranty of habitability in leases:
Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
Quesenbury v. Patrick, CCH Pov. L. REP.
15,803 (Colo. County
Ct. March 1972); Bonner v. Beechem, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Pov. L. REP.
11,098 (Colo. County Ct., 1970).
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237
A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (illegal lease theory).
Givens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309, 190 S.E.2d 607 (1972).
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (furnished
dwellings); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482
(1969) (unfurnished dwellings).
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Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972);
Longenecker v. Hardin, 130 Ill. App. 2d 468, 264 N.E.2d 878
(1970).
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
Reed v. Classified ParkingSystem, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970).
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemmingway, 41 U.S.L.W. 2518 (Mass.,
Mar. 5, 1973).
Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972).
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (warranty
implied in language of lease expressly limiting use of premises to
dwelling); Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124, 274 A.2d 865
(Dist. Ct. 1971).
15,945
Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, CCH Pov. L. REP.
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Aug. 4, 1972); accord, Morbeth Realty Co. v.
Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1971) (rent abated); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971) (rent abated); Ianacci v.
Pendis, 64 Misc. 2d 178, 315 N.Y.S.2d 399 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970)
(tenant entitled to return of security deposit); Garcia v. Freeland
Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1970) (tenant entitled to repair and deduct). Contra, Graham v.
Wiseburn, 39 A.D.2d 334, 334 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1972) (no implied
warranty of fitness for occupancy of residential premises in absence of statute or express agreement).
Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972).
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (warranty
of habitability implied from applicable housing codes); Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963). Contra,
Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970) (municipal housing code provides its own regultory procedures and
does not reflect congressional intent that it be implied into leases
and made an implied covenant mutually dependent on tenant's
obligation to pay rent).
The following jurisdictions have expressly rejected the theory of an
implied warranty of habitability or fitness for purpose:
Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972) (warranty of
habitability).
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Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1969)
(warranty of fitness for purpose).
Parris v. Sinclair Refining Co., 359 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1966) (Tennessee does not recognize warranty of fitness for purpose).
Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distributing Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (warranty of fitness for purpose).
Teglo v. Porter, 65 Wash. 2d 772, 339 P.2d 519 (1965) (warranty of
fitness for purpose).
Periodicals

ABA

COMMITTEE ON LEASES, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 550 (1971)-

surveys current judicial and legislative efforts towards reform in
landlord-tenant law, with extensive discussion of the landlord's
obligation to provide services and to repair under the Model Code.
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor:
Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971)-provides extensive economic
analysis of slum housing markets, and the effect on them that
rigorous code enforcement may have.
Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract
(Damages for Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of
Covenants), 16 TEXAS L. REV. 47 (1937)-concludes that abandonment of old feudal concepts of the independence of lease covenants merely recognizes the reality of the contractual aspect of
leases.
Bixby, Implied Warranty of Habitability:New Rightfor Home Buyers,

6

CLEARINGHOUSE REV.

468 (1972)-observes that rejection of

caveat emptor and the development of implied warranties in the
sale of goods has been followed by similar developments in the
lease or sale of realty.
Bruno, New Jersey Landlord-Tenant Law: Proposalsfor Reform, 1
RUTGERS-CAMDEN

L.J. 299 (1969)-contends that since courts

have failed to provide relief for the indigent tenant faced with
substandard housing, the legislature should provide, inter alia, rent
withholding and repair-and-deduct procedures, and a warranty of
habitability and fitness for intended use.
Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for SubstandardHousing:
Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia, 59
GEO. L.J. 909 (1971)-studies the extensive judicial and legislative
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reform of landlord-tenant law in the District of Columbia which
has provided the tenant with broad affirmative remedies and defenses and represents a sound and appropriate response to the urban
housing crisis that may be applied in jurisdictions throughout the
country.
Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenants' Remedies Act, 7 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 357 (1970)-proposes a standard of habitability measured
by housing code and health and safety regulations, and authorizes
rent withholding, abatement, suit for damages, and repair-anddeduct remedies when landlord fails to maintain standard of
habitability.
Durnford, The Landlord's Warranty Against Defects and the Recourses
of the Tenant, 15 McGILL L.J. 361 (1969)-argues that although
Canadian law requires the landlord to warrant against all defects
in leased premises which prevent or diminish their intended use,
whether such defects are known to the landlord or not, reform is
needed to unify the tenant's right to damages for defects with the
landlord's obligation to repair.
Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an UrbanSociety,
46 J. URBAN L. 695 (1969)-recognizes that housing codes, alone
or with tenant-initiated remedies, have failed to alleviate substandard housing conditions. Before landlord may collect rent, he should
be required to obtain a certificate of occupancy stating that the
premises complies with local housing regulations; such license or
certificate should be subject to periodic renewals.
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 CoLuM. L. REV. 1254 (1966)-suggests that a new civil remedy
for housing code violations is required to provide the necessary
code enforcement.
Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO L. REV. 189 (1968)-observes
in the lessor's emerging tort liability some relief from the strict
doctrine of caveat lessee and the doctrine's rejection of implied
covenants of fitness or habitability.
Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, 1 NEW MExico L. REV. 1,
86-107 (1971)-surveys the recent development of the warranty of
habitability first expressed in Pines v. Perssion, the illegal lease
concept of Brown v. Southall Realty Company, and the contractual implied warranties developed in Lemle v. Breeden and Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.
Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960)urges the adoption of statutes imposing on lessor a duty to put the
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premises in a fit condition and to keep them repaired in states
currently lacking such legislation.
Moskovitz, Defending an Eviction Action by Showing Housing Code
Violations-Model Answer and Points and Authorities, 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 98 (1969)-offers six theories on which a
defense against eviction for nonpayment of rent where code violations exist may be based: illegal contract; illegal performance by
landlord of obligations under the lease; failure of consideration;
constructive eviction; actual partial eviction; equitable doctrine of
"clean hands."
Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and The Implied Warranty of Habitability-Some New Breakthroughs, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 49
(1970)-discusses major cases, issues, and available remedies, including the "substantiality" test and waiver of the implied warranty, rescission, suits for damages and specific performance, and
rent withholding.
2 National Housing and Development Law Project, Handbook on
Housing Law, Landlord-Tenant Materials (1970)-presents a
compilation of rent withholding materials, with model brief, including implied warranty of habitability argument.
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant:A CriticalEvaluation
of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
225 (1969)-analyzes the bifurcated relationship between landlord
and tenant that has developed from the common law, in which the
tenant's right to possession and his obligation to pay rent are
independent from, and unrelated to, the landlord's obligation to
provide services. The relationship fails to recognize that in the
modern setting the tenant seeks not merely possession, but possession of habitable premises. Current legislative efforts, including
housing and sanitation codes and rent abatement devices, offer
ineffective remedies, and courts must fashion new remedies to reflect the following policies: rent serves as consideration for services
as well as for possession; lease covenants are reciprocal; lease of
space for living purposes includes a warranty of habitability; vigorous rent withholding remedies and the tenant's right to sue for
damages need be established; and the equitable doctrine of "good
faith" should be applied to the landlord-tenant relationship.
Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two
Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 670 (1966)-contends that the
landlord's implied affirmative obligations should be supplemented
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by a statutory lease establishing, inter alia, the landlord's duty to
maintain the premises in a condition fit for occupancy that complies with the requirements of the relevant housing codes and the
tenant's right to withhold rent or terminate the lease when the
landlord fails to perform his obligations.
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant-Proposalfor Change,
54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966)-proposes a change in the common law's
consistent refusal to recognize an implied warranty of habitability
in leases. The current housing shortage and substandard condition
of much available low-income housing require that, in exchange for
the exorbitant rent the tenant pays him, the landlord be compelled
to furnish and maintain shelter that meets at least the minimum
standards of habitability. The warranty of habitability may be
implied directly from the applicable housing codes, from an illegal
contract theory, or drawn by analogy from the implied warranties
found in the law of sales of chattels or newly constructed buildings.
Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44
DENVER L.J. 387 (1967)-suggests that changing conditions in the
nature of lease transactions and the inequality of knowledge concerning the premises require the development of a limited implied
warranty of habitability.
Comment, The Failure of a Landlord to Comply with Housing Regulations as a Defense to Non-Payment of Rent, 21 BAYLOR L. REV.
372 (1969)-suggests that the cumulative effect of the Brown v.
Southall Realty void lease defense and the Edwards v. Habib ban
on retaliatory evictions may permit tenants to remain rent-free
indefinitely in substandard housing.
Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24
(1970)-predicts that the application of contract and warranty
principles to landlord-tenant law will better reflect the current
landlord-tenant relationship and help to remedy slumlord abuses.
Note, Emerging Landlord Liability: A JudicialReevaluation of Tenant
Remedies, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 387 (1971)-warns that judicial
establishment of tenant's repair-and-deduct remedy may help to
alleviate substandard housing conditions where landlords make
sufficient profit, but may lead to abandonment of buildings by
landlords unable to afford the improvements.
Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisalof the Habitabilityand Repair
Problem, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 739 (1971)-argues that the
enactment and enforcement of statutes implying in all leases a
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warranty of habitability, providing a repair-and-deduct remedy,
proscribing retaliatory acts by the landlord, and abolishing the selfhelp eviction are required to supplement current judicial and legislative efforts to guarantee habitable premises for modern urban
tenants.
Comment, Tenant's Remedies in the District of Columbia: New Hope
for Reform, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 80 (1968)-discusses the
Brown v. Southall Realty and Edwards v. Habib defenses.
Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied
Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban

Leases, 56

CORNELL

L.

REV.

489 (1971)-concludes that Javins v.

First Nat'l Realty Co., and Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave.
Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord obliged
to take reasonable precautions to protect his tenants from the
foreseeable criminal acts of third persons), provide the tenant with
relief from building decay and rising crime, extend the established
laws of sales and innkeeper-guest to landlord-tenant disputes, and
emphasize the dependent obligations and the landlord's inherent
service duties that characterize the modern lease.
Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of HabitabilityDemise of the TraditionalDoctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DE PAUL
L. REV. 955 (1971)-surveys leading cases in development of implied warranties in sale and lease of real property.
Note, Current Interest Areas of Landlord-Tenant Law in Iowa, 22
DRAKE L. REV. 376 (1973)-concludes that judicial recognition of
the implied warranty of habitability in Mease v. Fox represents a
significant development in tenants' protection. Statutory control of
rental security deposits is also required.
Note, Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin Housing Leases, 21 DRAKE
L. REV. 300 (1972)-views the modern lease as a contract, subject
to contract law of implied warranty and the remedies of rescission,
reformation, and damages. Public policy, the inequality of bargaining power between landlord and tenant, and the severe housing
shortage suggest that efforts to contract away the implied warranty
should be proscribed.
Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability:A n Incipient Trend in the
Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123
(1971)-analyzes the emerging implied warranty as permitting the
aggrieved tenant to discard the ineffective remedy offered by con-
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structive eviction and to seek instead damages, rescission, or reimbursement for cost of repairs necessary to make premises habitable.
Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-JudicialReinforcement

of the Housing Code, 56 GEO. L.J. 920 (1968)-concludes that
although the illegal contract theory may preclude recovery of unpaid rent by violating landlords and may force them to comply
with housing code standards, additional protection against a landlord's retaliatory measures and a direct attack on the problems of
slum dwellings are required to promote effective relief.
Note, Enforcement of MunicipalHousing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801
(1965)-concludes that although code enforcement may have effected the correction of expensive structural deficiencies on a citywide basis and forced the removal of imminently dangerous conditions, it has failed to impose standards of maintenance and sanitation. Rehabilitation of urban slums requires that code enforcement
be undertaken in conjunction with urban planning, clearance, public housing, urban renewal, zoning laws, and mortgage guarantee
and loan programs.
Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21

L.J. 458 (1970)-notes that the emergence of the implied warranty of habitability closely parallels the development
from nonliability to strict liability in the areas of chattel manufacture and of builder-vendor. Continued development of reform in
landlord-tenant law may result in the application of products liability doctrine and torts remedies to landlord-tenant law.
HASTINGS

Comment, Housing Codes and the Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON

L. REv. 522 (1971)-argues that while the contract remedies provided by an implied warranty of habitability are significant in
combatting slumlordism, a private action in tort would offer
greater damages and present a more pressing threat to the offending landlord.
Note, D.C. Housing Regulations, Article 290, Section 2902: Construed Pursuant to Brown v. Southall Realty Co. and Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp.-A New Day for the Urban Tenant?,

16 HOWARD L.J. 366 (1971)-suggests that the contractual
remedies now available to the tenant faced with violations of
the housing code provide effective means to induce repair, but
may drive-private landlords, and their units, from the market. To
realize the purpose behind the Housing Regulations the District
must be prepared to assume the burden of providing safe and
sanitary housing.
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Comment, Rent Mitigationfor Housing Code Violations, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 460 (1970)-notes that the emerging implied warranty of
habitability permits the tenant to withhold rent to secure his right
to a habitable dwelling and reflects judicial efforts to solve the
problems of substandard urban housing.
Note, Lindsey v. Normet: Landlord-TenantRelationships-A Judicial
or Legislative Definition?, 11 J. FAMILY L. 775 (1972)-suggests
that the Supreme Court decision that makes the definition of the
landlord-tenant relationship a legislative rather than a judicial
function may impede judicial reformation of landlord-tenant law
and may undermine the judicially created implied warranties of
habitability established in Pines v. Perssion and Javins.
Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor As Applied to Both the Leasing
and Sale of Real Property: The Needfor ReappraisalandReform,

2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L. REV. 120 (1970)-concludes that the
emerging implied warranty against latent defects in the sale or
lease of realty reflects a policy decision by some jurisdictions to
shift the risks attending real estate transactions to the party better
able to evaluate those risks and protect against them.
Note, Habitability in Slum Leases, 20 S.C.L. REV. 282
(1968)-suggests that landlord-tenant law requires extensive statutory reform that would recognize warranties of fitness and habitability and would place the duty to repair on the landlord.
Note, The California Lease-Contract or Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 244 (1952)-notes that California recognizes the dual nature
of leases. Dependent construction of covenants would permit tenant to abandon and be excused from further rent following landlord's breach.
Note, The Plight of the Indigent Tenant: The Failure of the Law to
Provide Relief, 5 SUFFOLK L. REV. 213 (1970)-concludes that the
emerging implied warranty of habitability in leases may provide
relief to the otherwise remediless indigent tenant faced with substandard housing.
Comment, The Landlord's Common-Law Duty to Repair: Some Recent Innovations, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 997 (1971)-notes that
recent decisions have relied on an implied warranty of habitability,
private law rent withholding, and common law repair-and-deduct
principles to provide the tenant facing substandard conditions with
effective remedies to secure needed repairs.
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Note, Landlord and Tenant: Lease Agreement Void As An Illegal Contract When Dwelling Is In Violation of Local Housing Code At
Time of Letting: Brown v. Southall Realty Company, 30 U. PITT.
L. REV. 134 (1968)-contends that while the illegal contract theory
recognizes society's interest in providing habitable living quarters
for the poor, it does little to further the indigent's interest in maintaining possession. Judicial recognition of an implied warranty of
habitability is required to permit the tenant to remain in possession
while withholding rent.
Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished
Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U.
RICHMOND

L.

REV.

316 (1969)-argues that the lessor's duty

should be limited to the exercise of reasonable care to insure that
premises are safe for use when the tenant takes possession.
Comment, Plotting the Long-Overdue Death of Caveat Emptor in
Leased Housing, 6 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 147
(1971)-concludes that the increasing emphasis on the contractual
nature of leases, some relaxation of the abandonment requirement
for constructive eviction, and the emerging implied warranties of
habitability recognized the social realities of urban tenancies and
undermine the outdated caveat emptor principles of landlordtenant law.
Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness &
Habitability, 16 VILL. L. REV. 710 (1971)-contrasts the implied
warranty based on analogy to sales law with the warranty based
on housing codes: the former offers the flexibility of remedies modeled on the Uniform Commercial Code, but may be subject to
disclaimer of liability; the latter may effectively preclude disclaimer of liability, but lacks flexibility in application.
Comment, Rent Abatement Legislation: An Answer to Landlords, 12
VILL. L. REV. 631 (1967)-contends that legislation adopting the
relevant municipal housing codes, establishing a minimum standard of habitability, and authorizing supervised rent withholding
when conditions fall below standards is needed to insure the availability of decent low-income housing.
Comment, The New Michigan Landlord-Tenant Law: PartialAnswer
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to a Perplexing Problem, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 836 (1969)- notes
that legislation imposes warranty of habitability and engrafts all
applicable housing codes onto residential leases for terms of less
than one year.
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 818 (1970)-comments on Lemle v. Breeden.
45 MARQ. L. REV. 630 (1962)-comments on Pines v. Perssion.
31 U. PITT. L. REV. 138 (1969)-comments on Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper.
25 VAND. L. REV. 654 (1972)-comments on Lindsey v. Normet.
Comments on Brown v. Southall Realty Co.:

4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
21 VAND. L. REV. 117 (1968).

REV.

204 (1968).

Comments on Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.:
20 BUFFALO L. REV. 567 (1971).
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152 (1970).

84

HARV.

L.

REV.

729 (1971).

6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 193 (1970).

32

OHIO STATE

L.J. 207 (1971).

39 U. CIN. L. REV. 600 (1970).
23 U. FLA. L. REV. 785 (1971).

24

VAND.

L.

REV.

425 (1971).

For further discussion of remedies for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability see periodicals and annotations listed
under Habitability: Statutory Remedies, infra at 740.
Annotations
Implied warranty by seller, in absence of fraud or misrepresentation,
as to fitness, condition, or quality of new dwelling, 78 A.L.R.2d
446 (1961).
Modern status of rules as to existence of implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use of leased premises, 40 A.L.R.3d 646
(1971).
Habitabilityand Fitness, CCH Pov. L. REP.
2105 (1972).
Lease Illegality or Invalidation, CCH Pov. L. REP.
2210 (1972).
Model Code and Uniform Act
See provisions in Habitability: Statutory Remedies, infra at 743.
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Statutory Remedies
Development

In a number of jurisdictions, statutes create a warranty of habitability (see supra at 727) in all residential leases or otherwise place upon
the landlord the obligation to put and maintain the premises in a habitable condition. Most of these statutes alter the tenant's obligation with
respect to paying rent in the event that the landlord breaches his obligation. The statutes are generally of three types:
Rent abatement.-The tenant is relieved of all obligation to pay
rent for the duration of the breach.
Rent withholding.-The tenant may deposit the rent in judicial
escrow until the landlord remedies the breach.
Repair-and-deduct.-Thetenant may make repairs resulting from
the landlord's breach and deduct the cost from the rent.
Leading Cases
DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971)-held Pennsylvania's rent withholding statute constitutional.
Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1971)-upheld the constitutionality of New York's Spiegel Law
authorizing rent abatement for welfare recipients.
Cf Leading cases for Habitability: Implied Warranty, supra at 728.
Jurisdictions
The following statutes authorize rent abatement as a tenant's remedy:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 47-24a to c (Supp. 1969).

MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Cum. Supp. 1972).
The following statutes authorize rent withholding as a tenant's
remedy:
Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 441.570-.580 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:42-85 to -97 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACT. & PROC. LAW §§ 769-82 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1972).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
The following statutes authorize repair-and-deduct as a tenant's
remedy:
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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tit. 25, §§ 5301-11 (Cum. Supp. 1970) (also authorizes termination of rental agreement).
HAWAII REV. STATS. §§ 521-42, -62 to -66 (Supp. 1972) (also authorizes termination of rental agreement).
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2692-95 (1952).
DEL. CODE ANN.

MONT. REV. CODES

§§ 42-201, -202 (1947) (also authorizes termina-

tion of rental agreement by vacating).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12, -13 (1960) (also authorizes termination
of rental agreement by vacating).
OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (1954) (also authorizes termination

of rental agreement by vacating).
VA. CODE § 32-64, -66 (1969) (applies to landlord's failure to supply
sanitary privy or water closet; tenant required to supply the facili-.
ties and deduct the cost from the rent).
The following statutes authorize other tenant's remedies:
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111 to -113 (1966) (requires landlord to keep
premises in repair and makes him liable for substantial improvements made by tenant with his consent and for all damages resulting from his failure to repair).
ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 23, § 11-23 (1968) (authorizes welfare agency
to withhold rent allowance from the recipient, or directly from the
landlord, where welfare recipient is living in premises which violate
housing or building code; eviction of tenant for rent withholding
under this statute prohibited).
IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 413 (1949) (forbids landlord to collect rents with-

out first obtaining health certificate stating that the leased premises complies with the minimum state housing requirements; municipality authorized to maintain civil action against violators).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1972) (authorizes tenant
to rescind rental contract and recover just proportion of rent).
N.Y. Soc. WEL. LAW § 143-b(2) (McKinney 1966) (authorizes abatement of welfare recipient's rental allowance).
Periodicals
Clough, Pennsylvania'sRent Withholding Law, 73 DICK. L. REV. 583
(1969).
Simmons, Passionand Prudence:Rent Withholding Under New York's
Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 572 (1969).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Comment, The Failure of a Landlord to Comply with Housing Regulations as a Defense to the Non-Payment of Rent, 21 BAYLOR L.
REV. 372 (1969)-criticizes the illegal contract theory used in
Brown v. Southall Realty Co. (supra at 728) as a basis for rent
withholding.
Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CAL. L. REV. 304 (1965)-provides general background material with emphasis on rent strikes and rent withholding
by welfare officials.
Comment, Rent Mitigationfor Housing Code Violations, 56 IowA L.
REV. 460 (1970)-discusses the unanswered questions in Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp. (supra at 728). The comment proposes
that an administrative agency determine whether a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability has occurred and the appropriate
rent reduction resulting from the breach.
Comment, Rent Withholding: The Tenant's Remedy Against Unfit
Housing, 10 J. FAMILY L. 481 (1971)-develops common law theories for rent withholding and concludes that the material failure of
consideration theory is the most sound.
Comment, Rent Withholding: A New Approach to Landlord-Tenant
Problems, 2 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 105 (1969)-criticizes existing
rent withholding legislation and proposes a model statute.
Note, Rent Withholdingfor Minnesota:A Proposal,55 MINN. L. REV.
82 (1970)-discusses the inadequacies of common law remedies
and proposes that Minnesota enact a rent withholding statute similar to the ABF Model Code provisions (see infra at 743).
Comment, Rent Withholding for Welfare Recipients: An Empriical
Study of the Illinois Statute, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 798 (1970)studies in detail the operation of the Illinois statute.
Note, DePaul v. Kauffman: The Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act,
32 U. PITT. L. REV. 626 (1971)-discusses the points clarified and
question left unanswered by the case holding Pennsylvania's rent
withholding statute constitutional.
Note, Rent Withholding-A Proposalfor Legislation in Ohio, 18
Western RES. L. REV. 1705 (1967)-reviews tenant's common law
remedies and concludes that legislation is needed. The note offers
a draft of a proposed statute.
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10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 113 (1971)-comments on DePaul v. Kauffman.
Cf. periodicals listed under Habitability: Implied Warranty, supra
at 731.
Annotations
Rights and remedies of tenant upon landlord's breach of covenant to
repair, 28 A.L.R. 1448 (1924), supplemented by 28 A.L.R.2d 446
(1953).
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance authorizing withholding or payment into escrow of rent for period during which
premises are not properly maintained by landlord, 40 A.L.R.3d
821 (1971).
Tenant's right, where landlordfails to make repairs, to have them
made and set off against rent, 40 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1971).
Model Code
Under sections 2-203 to -208, the landlord must supply and maintain fit dwelling units in compliance with all applicable state and local
building or sanitation codes or regulations and in compliance with general standards of habitability and safety. The Model Code allows rent
withholding as a tenant's remedy in the following situations:
(a) If the landlord fails to repair, the tenant, after informing the
landlord, may have minor repairs made and deduct the cost from his
rental payment. Section 2-206.
(b) If the landlord fails to supply hot water, the tenant may, as
an alternative remedy, keep a portion of the rent. If the landlord fails
to supply reasonable water and/or heat, the tenant, as an alternative
remedy, may procure substitute housing during which time his rent will
be abated. Section 2-207.
(c) If the premises are made partially unusable by fire or other
casualty, the tenant may vacate that part and reduce his rent to the fair
market value of the part he continues to occupy. Section 2-208.
Uniform Act
Section 2.104(a)(2) places upon the landlord an affirmative duty to
make repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and maintain the
premises in a fit and habitable condition. The remainder of section
2.104(a) places specific duties upon the landlord to insure maintenance
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of the premises. These include conforming to building and housing
codes; maintaining supplied or required facilities and applicances in
good and safe working order; removing waste; and providing adequate
running water, hot water, and reasonable heat unless such are physically
within the exclusive control of the tenant and are supplied by a direct
public utility connection or unless the dwelling is not required by law
to be so equipped.
Breach of any of these obligations entitles the tenant under section
4.101 to terminate the rental agreement no less than thirty days after
the landlord's receipt of written notice of the breach if the breach is not
remedied within fourteen days. Actual damages may be recovered, including reasonable attorney's fees if the breach is willful. Recurrence of
the breach within six months entitles the tenant to terminate the rental
agreement fourteen days after written notice to the landlord of the
breach. Termination of the rental agreement entitles the tenant to the
return of all security recoverable under section 2.101 and all prepaid
rent.
B.

Tort

1. Slumlordism
Development
At common law, the doctrine of caveat emptor limited the landlord's tort liability and held him liable only for injuries caused by latent
defects in the premises of which he had, or reasonably should have had,
knowledge. During occupancy, the landlord was generally responsible
for the condition of common areas. Otherwise, he was liable only for
injury resulting from his active negligence.
The promulgation of housing codes and the development of the
warranty of habitability (supra at 727) have given the tenant new contractual remedies against the landlord. Additionally, tort theories have
been suggested that, if adopted, may provide slum tenants with relief
from substandard housing conditions. One recently proposed theory
urges that courts recognize a new tort, "slumlordism," in actions
against landlords who maintain unfit housing:
One who undertakes to perform a service for his own economic benefit, but who
performs it in a way both inconsistent with those standards which represent minimum social goals as to decent treatment and in a manner that itself is violative of
the law, under circumstances where the victim had no meaningful alternative but
to deal with him, commits a tort for which substantial damages ought to lie.
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Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 890
(1967). Additional tort remedies that have been proposed include nuisance, intentional infliction of mental distress, and negligence per se.
Although the proposed tort remedies have not yet developed a
substantial body of case law, at least one court has imposed liability for
the tort of slumlordism. Moreover, several recent cases have included
claims for relief based on the emerging tort theories.
Leading Case
Quesenbury v. Patrick, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 7683, at 352 (No.
68942, Colo. Dist. Ct., El Paso County, June 8, 1972)-upheld a
lower court decision that slumlordism presents a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The lower court listed the elements of the
tort:
(a) existence of a valid housing code;
(b) provision in the code for criminal liability;
(c) notice of defects to the landlord;
(d) failure of the landlord to make repairs within a reasonable time; and
(e) damage to the victim as a result of the failure to repair.
Factors influencing the amount of damages include:
(a) plaintiff's lack of education or financial ability to move;
(b) widespread practice of the landlord's rental policy; and
(c) financial loss suffered by the victim.
Jurisdictions
In these jurisdictions plaintiffs have included in their complaints
claims for relief based on tort:
Ball v. Tobeler, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 4988, at 353 (No. 2
Civ. 38424, Cal. Ct. App., filed Mar. 27, 1972) (tenants allege that
landlord's violation of housing codes constitutes an actionable
nuisance); Arguelles v. Cortez, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 5503,
at 165 (No. 10639, Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 7, 1972) (reversing trial
court's order that sustained demurrer to tenant's complaint alleging intentional infliction of mental distress attributable to the landlord's violation of housing codes); Rose v. Hewes Co., 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 2410, at 142 (No. 393347, Cal. Super.
Ct. Alameda County, Sept. 16, 1969) (Tenant filed complaint
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charging landlord with intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment, trespass, and invasion of
privacy. The lower court granted a temporary restraining order to
prevent defendant landlord from evicting plaintiff tenant. A settlement was reached, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 175 (1972), in which
landlord agreed either to make repairs within a specified time or
to end residential occupancy of the building, to allow plaintiff to
remain in the apartment at a rental of one dollar per month until
the repairs were completed, and to return plaintiff's rental payments for the past four years in settlement of plaintiff's claim of
damages for mental anguish); Mendoza v. Gonzales, [1968-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
9416 (No. 217161, Cal.
Super. Ct., Jan. 31, 1969) (tenant filed complaint seeking actual
and punitive damages for intentional infliction of mental distress
based on landlord's failure to keep building in safe and sanitary
condition).
Littlefield v. Rice, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
10,524, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 2568, at 238 (Me. Super.
Ct., complaint undated) (complaint filed charging landlord with
the torts of slumlordism and nuisance).
Golden v. Gray, 68 Misc. 2d 679, 327 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County, 1971) (plaintiff's complaint urging recovery against slumlord on alternative tort theories dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action).
Periodicals
Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66
L. REV. 451 (1968).
Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL. B.J. 204 (1969).
Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MICH. L. REV.
MICH.

465 (1968).
Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65

MICH.

L.

REV.

869 (1967).

Model Brief

A model brief compiling tort theories against slum landlords has
been prepared by:
National Housing and Development Law Project
Earl Warren Legal Institute
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
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Criminal Acts of Third Parties
Development

Tenants seeking to hold their landlords liable for injuries resulting
from the criminal acts of third persons have generally been denied recovery on two grounds. First, in the absence of a special relationship
between the parties-and the landlord-tenant relationship traditionlly
has not qualified-the common law ordinarily imposes no duty on a
private individual to protect another person from the harmful acts of a
third party. Additionally, the courts have regarded the criminal as an
"independent moral agency" over whom the landlord exercised no control. Accordingly, the tenant has failed to show that the landlord's
conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. Some recent cases have
departed from the traditional common law positions on both of these
points, however, and have permitted the tenant to recover.
Leading Cases
Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (1964),
affd mem., 44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965)-held, in a case
involving non-criminal conduct by a third party, that a landlord
owes his tenants a duty of reasonable care as to portions of the
premises within the landlord's control. If breach of this duty is a
proximate cause of harm inflicted by a third person, then the landlord is liable for the injury whether or not the injury was precipitated by an independent, intervening cause.
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970)-held that the landlord of a multiple-dwelling
unit has a duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of third
parties committed in common areas under his control. Here, the
landlord had actual and constructive notice that crimes were being
committed against the tenants and was held to a standard of reasonable care. On the theory that a covenant for protection is implied in the lease, this standard of care is measured by the level of
protection actually provided by the landlord at the inception of the
lease; when tort theory is applied, the standard is measured by the
care commonly provided in apartments of similar type in a similar
community.
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Jurisdictions
The following cases have held that where there are special conditions from which the landlord should foresee an unreasonable risk or
likelihood of harm from criminal acts of others, the landlord must take
reasonable measures to protect his tenants from such dangers:
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
Kendall v. Gore Properties,Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
Johnson v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
Mayer v. Housing Authority, 44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965), affg
mem., 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (1964) (noncriminal act).
Bass v. New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Da Rocha v. N.Y. Housing Authority, 282 App. Div. 728, 122
N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (noncriminal act).
The following cases have refused to hold a landlord responsible for
the criminal acts of third parties:
Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
De Foe v. W. & J. Sloane, 99 -A.2d 639 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
Stelloh v. Cottage 83, 52 Ill. App. 2d 168, 201 N.E.2d 672 (1964).
Teall v. Harlow, 275 Mass. 448, 176 N.E. 533 (1931).
Johnston v. Harris,30 Mich. App. 627, 186 N.W.2d 752 (1971).
Peter Piper Tailoring Co. v. Dobbin, 195 Mo. App. 435, 192 S.W. 1044
(1917).
Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
McCappin v. Park Capital Corp., 42 N.J. Super. 169, 126 A.2d 51
(1956).
Tirado v. Lubarsky, 49 Misc. 2d 543, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y.C. 1966), affd mem., 52 Misc. 527, 276 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d
463 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1965).
Broaddus v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 113 Okla. 10, 237 P. 583 (1925).
Burns v. Gordon, 100 Pitt. Leg. J. 195 (Allegheny County Ct. 1952).
Periodicals
Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant
Security, 71 COLuM. L. REV. 275 (1971)-discusses Kline v. 1500
MassachusettsAve. Apartment Corp. and its implications.
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Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied
Warrantiesof Habitabilityand Safety in Residential UrbanAreas,

56

CORNELL

L.

REV.

489 (1971)-offers a general discussion of

tenants' rights, including the landlord's implied duty to protect the
tenant. The note concludes that Kline v. 1500 MassachusettsAve.
Apartment Corp. places the landlord-tenant relationship within the
legal purview of the common law of innkeeper and guest, but
criticizes the Kline court for its failure to supply an intelligible
standard of care for landlords to follow.
Note, Crime in Apartments: Landlord Liability, 5 GA. L. REv. 349
(1971)-suggests that the landlord in a large, multi-unit apartment
complex owes an affirmative duty to protect the tenant from forseeable criminal conduct, but urges that this duty should extend
only to crimes of violence against the tenant's person.
55 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (1971)-suggests that the remedies provided
by Kline v. 1500 MassachusettsAve. Apartment Corp. are inadequate.
20 RUTGERS L. REV. 140 (1965)-comments on Mayer v. Housing
Authority and discusses the nature of the special relationships
which impose an affirmative obligation of protection on private
individuals.
49 TEXAS L. REV. 586 (1971)-discusses the Kline decision and notes
that since the contemporary landlord retains substantial control
over the common areas of leased property, it is desirable to allocate the responsibility for protection in the common areas to the
landlord, who can most effectively exercise it.
24 VAND. L. REV. 195 (1970)-suggests that the ultimate scope of
the duty imposed by Kline on the landlord should be to protect the
tenant from forseeable criminal acts which occur either in the
common hallways or in the tenant's own apartment.
Annotations
Landlord's liability arising from theft of tenant's property, 58
A.L.R.2d 1289 (1958).
Private person's duty and liability to protect another against criminal attacks by a thirdperson, 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966).
Landlord's duty to protect against crime, 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
Treatises
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 315 (1965)-provides that there
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is no duty on an individual to prevent a third person from causing
physical harm to another in the absence of a special relationship
between the individual and the third person or unless a special
relationship exists between the individual and the injured party
which gives that party a right to protection. Sections 314A and 320
discuss these special relationships.
Model Code and Uniform Act
Although neither deals with a landlord's duty to protect his tenant
from the criminal acts of third parties, section 4.101 of the Uniform Act
authorizes a tenant's suit for actual damages resulting from the landlord's failure to maintain the premises, and section 2-205 of the Model
Code authorizes such an action if the landlord's failure to maintain is
willful or negligent. These sections, however, do not dispose of the issue
since the question of proximate cause is not addressed.
C.

ExtraordinaryRemedies-Receivership
Development

In some jurisdictions, when a landlord is unable or unwilling to
maintain the condition of his property within legal standards, a private
individual or a municipality may petition the court to place the building
in the hands of a receiver. The receiver, who may be the municipality,
a private party, or a social agency, is authorized to collect rents, apply
for grants and loans, and use these funds to rehabilitate the premises.
The amount expended constitutes a prior lien which must be satisfied
before any mortgage debt.
Leading Cases
In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964)-upheld the constitutionality of the New
York receivership statute: where there is a shortage of housing, and
multiple dwellings become dangerous and unfit, the state may
enact legislation reasonably aimed at correcting the condition and
promoting the public welfare, even though the means adopted may
impair the obligation of the mortgagee's contract or the private
rights established by existing contracts; additionally, the notice and
defense provisions of the law satisfy the requirements of due process.
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St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967)-held
that the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of repairing the
building in question was beyond the general power of a court of
equity. The court further stated that authority for this kind of relief
had to be conferred by statutes providing proper constitutional
safeguards.
Jurisdictions
The following statutes authorize judicial appointment of a receiver
to remedy substandard housing:
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Supp. 1973) (authorizes injunctive relief against violators of housing codes and grants to the
Chicago courts the equity power to appoint receivers).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347(b) (1968).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Supp. 1971).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I11, §§ 127A-J (Supp. 1972).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-79 to -84 (Supp. 1972).
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Periodicals
Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws, 52 Mass. L.Q.
205 (1967)-discusses Massachusetts legislation designed to combat unsanitary conditions in apartment buildings and compares
this legislation to New York law. The Massachusetts statutes give
a tenant, local board of health, or the local code enforcement
agency the authority to institute receivership proceedings.
Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. HousING 297 (1964).
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966)-traces code enforcement from
the turn of the century until 1966, explores the failure of the housing codes to prevent further decay of urban areas, and explores
alternative methods to achieve more effective enforcement.
Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 275 (1966)-criticizes the ineffectiveness of
local housing codes in curing slum conditions and suggests the use
of receivership as a possible means of combatting the problem of
a landlord's refusal to improve intolerable conditions. If the income from the property is inadequate to finance the repairs, the
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receiver should be authorized by the court to borrow the necessary
funds. Furthermore, the receiver should be permitted to secure the
debt with a lien on the property superior to all private debts.
McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law
Reform, 29 MD. L. REV. 193 (1969)-describes the operation of
receivership and discusses its role in the Model Code (see infra at
752).
Rosen, Receivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing
Needs of Low Income People, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L.
REV. 311 (1968)-describes the use of receivership in various jurisdictions and suggests that the use of receivership proceedings may
be effective in easing the shortage of urban housing and improving
living conditions for inhabitants of low-rent apartments.
Walsh, Slum Housing: The Legal Remedies of Connecticut Towns and
Tenants, 40 CONN. B.J. 539 (1966)-concludes that administrative
problems with enforcement render the Connecticut rent receivership statute inadequate to deal with slum housing conditions.
Zisook, Rehabilitation-When Is it Economically Feasible in
Renewal?, 15 J. HOUsING 157, 159 (1958).
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV.
801, 828-30 (1965)-discusses extensively the remedies available to
tenants under municipal housing codes. Receivership and its operation in New York and Chicago are considered.
Note, Preference Liens for the Costs of Repairing Slum Property,
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 141-examines the case law bearing on the
issue whether preference liens for slum repair costs are a legitimate
impairment of the obligations of contracts. The note concludes
that displacement of liens under a receivership or municipal repair
program would be no more disruptive than displacement forced by
property taxes, mechanics lien laws, and similar statutory priorities.
Model Code
The tenant may petition for the appointment of a receiver five days
after notice to the landlord of conditions dangerous to life, health, or
safety of the petitioner. In case of rodents or other vermin, he may
petition immediately upon notice to the landlord. Section 3-301.
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Section 3-302 defines necessary parties defendant. Mortgagees and
other lienors are given an opportunity to defend their interests.
Sufficient defenses to the proceeding include (section 3-303):
(1) The condition described in the petition does not exist at the
time of trial.
(2) Willful or negligent acts of a petitioner, his family, or persons
on the premises with his consent are responsible for the condition.
(3) A petitioner has refused to allow reasonable access to correct
the condition.
The court may stay judgment if a person having an interest in the
proceeding is willing and able to correct the condition in accordance
with the court's order and posts bond. The procedure to be followed if
such a person fails to comply with the provisions of the court's order
are described. Section 3-304.
Any suitable person may be appointed receiver. Section 3-305.
The receiver shall have the powers and duties accorded a receiver
forclosing a mortgage on realty and all other powers and duties deemed
necessary by the court, including the collection and use of rents, issues,
and profits of the property prior to and despite any assignments of rent.
These funds are to be used to correct the alleged condition of the premises, make the premises comply with all applicable legal standards, pay
all expenses reasonably necessary to the proper operation and management of the property, compensate the tenant for actual damages, and
pay the costs of the receivership proceeding and attorney's fees. Section
3-306(1).
The receiver is also authorized to issue and sell negotiable notes
superior and prior to all existing assignments, liens, and encumbrances
except taxes and assessments, and to obtain first mortgage insurance
from a federal agency. Section 3-306(2).
Section 3-307 outlines the procedure and criteria for discharging
the receiver. If the court determines that repairs cannot be paid out of
the future profits of the property, it shall not permit such repairs and
may order that appropriate action be taken, including demolition of the
building.
V.

LANDLORD'S AND TENANT'S RIGHTS-JUST COMPENSATION AND

EMINENT DOMAIN

Development
One of the most difficult of the eminent domain issues concerning
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tenancies is the method of valuation of the condemned property. Traditionally, the property has been valued as if it were an undivided fee, and
the resulting compensation has been apportioned between the landlord
and tenant. Recently, an alternative theory has gained support which
would require that the actual value of the existing leaseholds be considered when determining the total compensation.
Leading Case
People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967)-held that the constitutional
requirement of just compensation requires that the owner be made
whole for his actual loss. Therefore, the value of existing leaseholds
must be taken into account in determining total value when the
actual rent does not equal the economic rent.
Periodicals
Baker, Condemnation: Concepts and Consequences of Public Intervention in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 U. KANSAS L. REV..
399 (1961)-identifies interests that are, or, in the author's opinion, should be, protected and discusses the impact of condemnation
on the legal relationship between landlord and tenant.
Committee on Leases, Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 3 REAL
Prop., Prob. & Trust J. 226 (1968)-surveys the present state of
the law in this area.
Horgan, Some Legal and AppraisalConsiderationsin Leasehold Valuation Under Eminent Domain, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 34
(1953)-analyzes leading cases dealing with the elements of compensation, fixtures, and loss of business or profits.
Horgan & Edgar, Leasehold Valuation Problem in Eminent Domain,
4 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 1 (1969)-discusses the basic principles of leasehold valuation and gives a critical reading of People
ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Lynbar, Inc.
Johnston, "Just Compensation" for Lessor and Lessee, 22 VAND. L.
REv. 293 (1968)-criticizes market valuation in general and unit
valuation in particular. The author favors a theory of indemnity.
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Kanner, And Now, for a Word from the Sponsor: People v. Lynbar,
Inc. Revisited, 5 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 39 (1970)-defends
Lynbar in a response to the article by Horgan & Edgar.
Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REV.
477 (1962)-analyzes thoroughly the procedural and substantive
issues in condemning leaseholds.
Snitzer, Valuation and Condemnation Problems Involving Trade Fixtures, 16 VILL. L. REV. 467 (1971)-offers a general discussion of
the problems of definition and valuation of fixtures in the field of
eminent domain, with an extended exploration of the special problems concerning the landlord-tenant relationship.
Note, Condemnation and the Lease, 43 IOWA L. REV. 279 (1958)treats with little analysis three problems: the effect of condemnation on the obligation to pay rent; the lessee's right to compensation; and the apportionment of the compensation. The author also
deals briefly with the utility of condemnation clauses in a lease.
Annotations
Are different estates in real property taken under eminent domain
to be valued separately, or is entireproperty to be valued as a unit
and the amount apportioned among separate interests, 69 A.L.R.
1263 (1930), supplemented by 166 A.L.R. 1211 (1947).
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THE PUBLIC SECTOR
INTRODUCTION

This segment of the Project concerns the legal rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant in federally-assisted low-rent public
housing established by the United States Housing Act of 1937.1 Several
substantive legal problems have emerged from the Act, including the
location of public housing projects, the determination of eligibility standards for admission to public housing dwellings, the system by which
eligible applicants are assigned to available dwellings, the treatment of
tenants' grievances, and the standards for the eviction of tenants. Each
of these substantive problems further poses troublesome questions regarding the procedural safeguards due applicants and tenants. This segment attempts to describe the issues of current significance and to outline the resolutions offered by the courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies.
Although this Project does not attempt to treat the mechanics of
the public housing system under the United States Housing Act of 1937,
a basic outline of the statutory scheme is useful in understanding the
problems presented. The 1937 Housing Act provides for a public housing program financed by the federal government, but operated by local
governments. Under the Act, the state is required to enact enabling
legislation that authorizes municipalities to create local housing authorities (LHA's). The LHA is governed by a Board of Commissioners that
is appointed by local officials and has the primary responsibility for
developing new projects and operating existing ones.
To finance its housing programs, the LHA sells tax exempt bonds
amortized over a forty year period. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) enters into an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) that obligates the federal government to make annual payments of principal and interest on the bonds. Originally the LHA was
required to pay exclusively from the rents collected from tenants all
maintenance and administrative expenses of its projects. A 1969 amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, however, limits the amount of rent
the LHA can collect from a tenant to 25 percent of his income and
permits the federal government to subsidize part of the LHA's annual
2
operating expenses.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1970).
2. For a somewhat more thorough, yet still concise, description of the mechanics of the
development and financing of public housing projects, see Special Project, Public Housing, 22
VAND. L. REv. 875, 901-06 (1969).
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Although the primary emphasis of this segment of the Project is
directed at the traditional LHA-owned and operated public housing, the
landlord-tenant relationship in government-assisted, privately owned
housing will be treated in less detailed fashion where appropriate. The
most important government-assisted, privately owned program is the
section 236 program, incorporated into the National Housing Act of
1934 as section 236 by the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968. 3 The 236 program provides low- and moderate-income families
with rental housing developed and owned by private developers through
a program of mortgage insurance and interest subsidy payments. The
federal government's interest subsidy payments lower the interest rate
on the private owner's mortgage to one percent, and this saving must
be passed on to the tenant in the form of lower rental rates. Additional
assistance is available under section 101 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965,1 which provides for the payment of rent
subsidies to a limited number of tenants per project in an amount equal
to the excess of the fair market rental over 25 percent of the tenant's
income. The section 236 program has largely replaced the earlier, similar 221(d)(3) program, and throughout this Project they will be treated
as if they were the same program.5
Although HUD publishes regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, the regulations which are more important to the subjects treated
in this Project are published as circulars. The Supreme Court has ruled
that directives contained in these circulars are binding on the local
housing authorities.' The HUD circulars are compiled as the Low Rent
Management Manual contained in the HUD Unified Issuances System
of Low Rent Housing Handbooks.
II.
A.

SITE SELECTION

Introduction-TheProblem

While the subject of site selection in its entirety is beyond the scope
of this Project, the effect that a public housing project's location will
have on the city's pattern of residential racial segregation and on racial
segregation in the city's public housing projects merits consideration in
a treatment of landlord-tenant relations. Recently, public housing tenants and applicants have mounted successful judicial attacks on site
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (1970).
5. For a more complete discussion of the mechanics of the 236 program see C. EDSON & B.
LANE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING chs. 2 & 3 (1972).
6. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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selection decisions which would have effectively perpetuated segregation

both in public housing and in the residential pattern of the city. 7 These
attacks came in instances where all of the sites selected were in primarily
black areas of a city. Because most applicants are black, and because
most whites are reluctant to move into black neighborhoods, the selection of sites within black areas tends to create all-black housing projects
in all-black neighborhoods. The pertinent federal statute and the HUD
regulations thereunder are designed to stifle site selection which perpetuates residential segregation. Although the statute and regulations have

not been uniformly successful in achieving their purpose, the clear trend
of the few decisions on point is to require the local housing authorities
and HUD to take affirmative action to insure greater integration in low-

rent public housing projects. 8
B.

FederalStatutes and Regulations

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000d
(1970), provides:
No person. . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

Pursuant to that statute HUD has promulgated regulations designed to

assure compliance with its provisions. Section 1.4(b)(2)(i), 24 Code of
Federal Regulations (1970) provides: "A [local housing authority], in
determining the location or types of housing . . . may not . . utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting

persons to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin
....
" More detailed regulations appear in HUD Circular RHA
7410.1, chapter 1, section 1:
The aim of a local authority in carrying out its responsibility for site selection
should be to select from among sites which are acceptable under the other criteria
of this Section those which will afford the greatest opportunity for inclusion of
eligible applicants of all groups regardless of race, color, creed or national origin,
thereby affording members of minority groups an opportunity to locate outside of
areas of concentration of their own minority group. Any proposal to locate housing
only in areas of racial concentration will be primafacie unacceptable and will be
returned to the Local Authority for further consideration and submission of either
7. See notes 9-30, infra, and accompanying text.
8. See id. For an extensive treatment see C. EDSON & B. LANE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING ch. 9 (1972) (Site selection for §§ 235 and 236 housing).
See generally HUD Circular RHA 7410.1; Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site
Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970).
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(1) alternatiVe or additional sites in other areas so as to provide more balanced
distribution of the proposed housing or (2) a clear showing, factually substantiated,
that no acceptable sites are available outside the area of racial concentration ....

The next paragraph of that circular provides that the phrase "acceptable
sites are available" means sites which meet the other HUD criteria and
which can be purchased "within economically feasible cost limitations."
Furthermore, denial by the city officials of any required rezoning or
other site approval is deemed an acceptable reason for no site being
available outside an area of racial concentration. The local housing
authority faced with such a denial is required, however, to submit a
statement of its specific efforts to gain site approvals or rezoning from
the reluctant city official.
C.

Case Law

Despite these HUD regulations designed to provide desegregated
public housing facilities, tenants and prospective tenants have found it
necessary to resort to judicial action in attempts to force local housing
authorities to provide more integrated public housing. The leading case

in this area is Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,9 in which a

class comprised of black tenants and applicants for public housing
claimed that the Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) site selection
decision violated their fourteenth amendment rights. The first opinion
in the Gautreaux litigation'0 granted dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that,
regardless of intention, defendant's failure to select sites that would
alleviate Chicago's segregated housing patterns violated sections 1981
and 1983, 42 U.S.C. (1970), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000d. The court denied, however, defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim that CHA intentionally selected sites
and assigned tenants for the purpose of maintaining existing patterns of
racial segregation in Chicago in violation of these same statutes. The
court subsequently granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the ground
that CHA's intentional conduct in choosing sites did violate sections
1981 and 1983, 42 U.S.C. (1970).11 Looking at statistics showing the
racial composition of neighborhoods in which public housing was located, the court found that 99.5 percent of the public housing projects
were located in, or contiguous to, black neighborhoods. Moreover, the
court was persuaded by plaintiffs' evidence that in the five major family
9. 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. III. 1967).
10. Id.
II. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11.1969).
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housing programs undertaken since 1954, members of the city council
had rejected for racial reasons otherwise suitable sites in white neighborhoods, and that CHA officials had joined city council members in a plan
which effectively eliminated sites in white neighborhoods from consideration.' 2 In addition, testimony from CHA officials tended to indicate
that racial discrimination was a factor in the selection of sites. The court
concluded that all of this evidence raised a strong inference that contrary to the commands of the fourteenth amendment, impermissible
racial criteria were used in the selection of public housing sites in Chicago; since CHA did not present any evidence that impermissible racial
criteria were not used, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The court postponed final judgment for 30 days and ordered the
parties to enter into negotiations and attempt to "formulate a comprehensive plan to prohibit the future use, and to remedy the past effects,
of CHA's unconstitutional site selection and tenant assignment procedures." ' 3 When the parties failed to agree on such a comprehensive
plan, the district court entered its judgment order." The order is complex, but in essence it divides Chicago into two types of areas: "Limited
Public Housing Areas," which have over 30 percent non white residents
or are within one mile from any point on the perimeter of such tract;
and "General Public Housing Areas," which comprise the balance of
the city. The first 700 units started after the order were to be built in
the "General Public Housing Areas," and thereafter, 75 percent of all
public housing units built were to be located in these largely white areas.
Two further provisions of the order were designed to prevent a large
concentration of public housing units in one small area. First, CHA was
ordered to limit the size of the projects to house no more than 120
persons and to provide no units above the third floor for families with
children. Secondly, low rent public housing could not exceed fifteen
percent of the dwelling units in any given census tract.
The last reported decision to date in the Gautreaux litigation was
designed to implement the 1969 judgment order.15 In this decision, the
court noted that since July, 1971, the Chicago City Council had not
approved the acquisition of any sites submitted by the CHA pursuant
12. An Illinois statute provides that no property may be acquired by a public housing
authority without the prior approval of the city's governing body. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67.5, § 9
(Supp. 1973).
13. 296 F. Supp. at 914. For a discussion of the tenant assignment problem see pages 77274 infra.
1969).
14. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. I11.
15. 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
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to the judgment order. To effectuate its judgment orders, the court
ordered the CHA to forego approval by the city council and proceed
with the acquisition of sites and development of projects consistent with
its earlier order. Furthermore, the court declared that chapter 67.5,
section 9 of Illinois Revised Statutes (Supp. 1973), which requires local
government approval of any acquisition of property by a local housing
authority, "shall not be applicable to CHA's actions ....
Prior to the Gautreauxdecision, one federal district court had held
in Thompson v. Housing Authority 7 that the Miami Housing Authority's relocation of persons displaced by urban renewal into a black
neighborhood was not an act of racial discrimination in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court reasoned that there was a presumption of legality to official acts rebuttable
only by a clear showing to the contrary. Furthermore, the court declared
that housing authorities have broad discretion in determining sites and
that their decision would stand absent a showing of bad faith or action
in violation of the law. According to the court, not only did plaintiffs
fail to sustain their burden of showing bad faith or racial discrimination
in violation of the fourteenth amendment, but defendants' evidence affirmatively established that no discrimination was practiced in its selec8
tion of the site for the housing project sought to be enjoined.
Subsequent to the Gautreaux and Thompson cases, four other
courts have considered the issue of site selection for public housing. In
the first case, Hicks v. Weaver," a federal district court in Louisiana
enjoined a housing project which was to be built in a black neighborhood
of Bogalusa, Louisiana, and which was to house black tenants under an
official policy of segregation in force at the time of the site selection.
The court essentially adopted HUD Circular RHA 7410.1, chapter 1,
16. Id. at 830. The Gautreaux case is the subject of much comment. The most extensive
treatment covers not only the Gautreaux case but the whole area of discrimination in regard to
site selection and includes data and information gathered by a field study of the site selection
methods of 3 local housing authorities. Note, Racial Discriminationin Public Housing Site
Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970). A thoughtful criticism of the result reached in Gautreaux
may be found in Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970). See also Note, Discriminatory Site Selection in Public
Housing and FederalJudicial Response, 64 N.W.U.L. REV. 720 (1970); 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1172
(1969); 118 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1970).

17. 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
18. At least one commentator has called this case a sham on the theory that plaintiff in fact
represented landlords who were opposed for economic reasons to any public housing in their
neighborhood. Note, Racial Discriminationin Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV.
63, 117 n.352 (1970). Whether or not the case was a sham, the decision reached is narrow and has
not been followed.
19. 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
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section 120 and ruled that while the location of public housing in an allblack neighborhood was not per se violative of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,! it would raise a strong inference that, if unexplained, would support the finding of a violation. Moreover, a permissible explanation would require a showing that, for example, no other
suitable sites were available. After reviewing the Bogalusa Housing
Authority's past site selections-all of which were made while its official
policy of segregation was in effect-and the actual segregation which
resulted from those decisions, the court found that the dominant factor
in selecting sites for public housing in Bogalusa was the racial concentration of neighborhoods and that this intentional perpetuation of segregation in public housing violated both the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause and Title VI. To remedy these violations the court
issued a preliminary injunction against any further development of the
planned project until a full hearing on the merits could be held. In a
supplemental order, HUD was enjoined from dispersing any more funds
to the Bogalusa Housing Authority prior to the hearing.
El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Association v.
Tucson Housing Authority22 was decided just after Hicks. In El Cortez,
plaintiffs, who were property owners and residents in the only black
middle class neighborhood in Tucson, Arizona, sought to enjoin the
construction of a housing project which would be occupied by Negroes,
Mexican-Americans, and Indians. The trial court denied the injunction
and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The case is significant in
one major respect: no intent on the part of the housing authority to
discriminate against a racial minority was found. The housing authority
testified that although it was generally aware of the racial composition
of the neighborhood, no official consideration was given to that factor.
The court then read Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 3 section 1.4,
24 Code of Federal Regulations (1969), and the fourteenth amendment
as affirmatively requiring the housing authority to consider the racial
composition of the neighborhood in which the site under consideration
was to be located. The court agreed with Hicks that while the location
of a project in a black neighborhood does not automatically render the
site unacceptable, it does, nevertheless, create "strong doubts" as to the
acceptability. The effect of El Cortez, therefore, is to subject to attack
20.
21.
22.
23.

Text quoted at pp. 758-59 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), quoted at p. 758 supra.
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even neutral-action which results in discrimination, regardless of intent
to discriminate.
A similar result was reached in Banks v. Perk,24 in which the federal
district court ordered the Cleveland, Ohio, city government to reissue
previously revoked building permits for two low-rent housing projects
in white neighborhoods. Furthermore, the court declared that the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority "has an affirmative duty to
integrate its housing projects and to be instrumental in dispersing urban
housing patterns"' and enjoined the CMHA from building any more
low-rent public housing units in black neighborhoods. The decision was
based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26 on sections 1981
and 1983 of 42 U.S.C. (1970), on the Fair Housing Act of 1968,27 and
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. As in El
Cortez, the Banks court held that the plaintiffs need not show an intent
to discriminate on the part of the local housing authority, but may
prevail by showing that the LHA's action merely results in racial discrimination.
In Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority-° the
court noted that HUD regulations2 9 preclude the building of public
housing in an area of racial concentration unless it is shown that no
other suitable sites are available. The court found that neither HUD nor
the local housing authority had made a meaningful determination of
whether the site of a proposed project was in an area of racial concentration. HUD and the LHA were enjoined from building the proposed
project until such a determination consistent with guidelines set forth
in the opinion was made.
The decisions clearly indicate that an LHA cannot select sites for
its projects with an intent to maintain segregated public housing or
segregated residential patterns. It is too early to conclude, however, that
absent a showing of intent to discriminate an LHA's site selection can
be attacked successfully in every instance in which it results in segregated housing. Nor is it certain that the requirement of the Banks case,
that the LHA has an affirmative duty to be instrumental in the desegregation of urban housing by integrating its housing projects, will be
adopted in future decisions. "
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
land use,

341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
Id. at 1182.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
HUD Circular RHA 7410.1, ch. 1, § 1, quoted at pp. 758-59 supra.
Although the question of site selection for § 236 housing involves issues of zoning and
many of the considerations are the same as in the public housing area. Leading cases
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Since the number of applicants for public housing exceeds the supply of available units, some means of determining eligibility for admission is necessary. This problem is complicated by the overwhelming
excess of demand over supply, by the difficulty in determining the class
of low income families, and by the desire of local housing authorities
to achieve as much stability as possible in their projects. The choice of
eligibility criteria has largely been left to the discretion of local housing
authorities. At the outset, the rule that an applicant's income be below
the established maximum has required that the LHA's develop some
standard method of computing the applicant's income. Beyond this,
many local authorities have developed additional criteria such as net
asset maximums, the requirement of a good prior rent-paying record,
residency requirements, and so-called "desirability" standards. The desirability standards attempt to measure a family's social behavior and
determine whether they will be the kinds of tenants who will contribute
to the social well-being of the project, have proper respect for property
of the project or other tenants, and not be a nuisance to their neighbors.
Although problems develop with all of the eligibility criteria, the chief
source of litigation has been residency requirements and desirability
standards.
In addition to litigation involving the substantive requirements for
admission, controversy has surrounded the procedures used by local
housing authorities in dealing with applicants. Although questions have
arisen involving the order of waiting lists and notification of applicants
of their status on the list, the major issue has concerned whether a
rejected applicant is entitled to a hearing and, if so, what formalities are
required.
B.

Federal Substantive Eligibility Requirements

Section 1402(1) of 42 U.S.C. (1970) states: "The dwellings in low
rent housing shall be available solely for families of low income."
Subsection two defines "families of low income" as "families . . .who
are in the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough
concerning the subject of § 236 site selection include: Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970);
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971). A well known case which involves issues of
both urban renewal and site selection of a 221(d)(3) project is Shannon v. Department of Housing
& Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), noted in 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1229 (1971).
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to cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan area to build
an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their
use." 3 .1 Subject to HUD approval, the determination of specific income limits and rents is left to the local housing authorities. 3 The
authority to fix rents, however, is limited by a statutory provision which
requires a gap of twenty percent between the maximum public housing
rental limits "and the lowest rents at which private enterprise unaided
by public subsidy is providing. . . a substantial supply of decent, safe,
and sanitary housing ...
.
In regard to preferences among applicants, the federal law provides
only that
the public housing agency shall adopt and promulgate regulations establishing
admission policies which shall give full consideration to its responsibility for the
rehousing of displaced families, to the applicant's status as a serviceman or veteran
or relationship to a serviceman or veteran or to a disabled serviceman or veteran,
and to the applicant's age or disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing
need, and source of income: Provided,that in establishing such admission policies
the public housing agency shall accord to families of low income such priority over
single persons as it determines to be necessary to avoid undue hardship.3

A very general declaration of policy to the 1937 Housing Act
states: "It is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public
housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing program, including responsibility for the
establishment of rents and eligibility requirements (subject to approval
of the [federal] Authority), with due consideration to accomplishing the
objectives of this chapter while effecting economies.""
In addition to these federal statutes and regulations, local housing
authorities have developed their own substantive admission criteria.35
C.

The Case Law and Regulations
1. Residency Requirements

According to the 1969 Vanderbilt Law Review Special Project's
survey of the residency requirements of a number of local public housing
30.1. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1970).
31. HUD Circular RHA 7465.1 (June 1969).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(b)(ii) (1970).

33. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(2) (1970).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
35. A helpful discussion of eligibility requirements appears in Special Project, Public
Housing, 22 VAND. L. REV. 875, 907-23 (1969). An analysis and criticism of desirability standards,
focusing on the New York City regulations, appefrs in Schoshinski, PublicLandlordsand Tenants:
A Survey of the Developing Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 426-36. A discussion of eligibility requirements as related to both admission and eviction is found in Note, Nonfinancial Eligibility and
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agencies, most local agencies require only that the applicant reside in
the city at the time he applies for admission.36 A few local agencies do
establish length-of-time residency requirements, however, and some of
these have been the focus of litigation.
The leading case involving length-of-time residency requirements
for low-rent public housing applicants is Cole v. Housing Authority,"
in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that a two-year residency requirement violates the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The court, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's 1969
decision in Shapiro v. Thompson38 striking down length-of-time residency requirements for welfare applicants, found that the requirements
affected the right to travel-a constitutionally protected right which can
be impaired or "penalized" only if the state can show some compelling
interest. The defendant argued that the residency requirement was justified by four concerns: the city's interest in giving priority to the housing
needs of its own citizens; the facilitation of accurate planning for future
housing needs; the likelihood that the requirement calms voters' fears
of an influx of poor nonresidents to fill new housing and therefore
facilitates approval of future projects; and the recognition of older residents' "prior claim on [the city's] charity." The court held that these
concerns were not "compelling interests" that could justify penalizing
the right to travel and stated that "[e]ven by a standard of rational
relationship to a permissible goal, we doubt that the justifications put
forth by the Authority could withstand judicial scrutiny.
Lane v. McGarry0 explicitly rejected the Cole decision and found
that the Syracuse (N.Y.) Housing Authority's one-year residency requirement did not unreasonably burden, restrict, or penalize the exercise
of the right to travel. Holding that the state's interests do not have to
be compelling, and that the state must show only that there is a reasonable basis for the standards, the court found such a reasonable basis in
the need to allocate scarce low-rent dwellings which, unlike the welfare
payments in Shapiro v. Thompson, cannot simply be spread more thinly
over a greater number of people. The court concluded that residency
Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The Problem Family in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL
L. REv. 1122 (1968). The most recent piece on the admission problem is Comment, Gaining
Admission to Low-Rent Public Housing, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 35 (1972).
36. Special Project, supra note 35, at 915.
37. 435 F.2d 807 (Ist Cir. 1970).
38. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
39. 435 F.2d at 813.
40. 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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requirements gave a valid preference to "those whose jobs or present life
' 4
patterns bind them to the community. 1
The Lane decision has been effectively overruled, however, by King
v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority. 2 In King, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that a five-year residency
requirement for state-aided low-rent housing violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Concluding that the state must
show a compelling interest to penalize travel, the court noted that a
mere showing of some reasonable basis for the requirement will not
suffice. Defendant alleged justifications similar to those put forth in
both Cole and Lane, but the court refused to recognize these as compelling. The court also rejected a distinction urged by defendant between
intrastate and interstate travel, holding that both are protected by the
Constitution. At least one commentator agrees that a rigid length-ofresidency requirement is probably unconstitutional, but argues that
where there is a shortage of available low-rent housing units, a family's
length of residency is one legitimate factor in determining preferences
3
among applicants for the scarce units.1
2.
a.

DesirabilityStandards

Validity of DesirabilityStandards

While some commentators have criticized the use of desirability
requirements for determining eligibility for public housing,14 some
courts have expressly approved their use. Perhaps the most direct support of desirability criteria has come in Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan
Housing Authority,' in which the court rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the Toledo (Ohio) Housing Authority's standards were overly
41. Id. at 564.
42. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971), affg 314 F. Supp. 427
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43. Walsh, The Constitutionalityof a Length-of-Residency Test for Admission to Public
Housing, 49 J.URBAN LAW 121 (1971).
44. Several commentators have criticized the use of desirability standards for determining
eligibility to public housing. See Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the
Developing Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 426-36; Special Project, PublicHousing, 22 VAND. L. REV.
875, 919-22 (1969); Note, Nonfinancial Eligibilityand Eviction Standardsin Public Housing-The
Problem Family in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122, 1128-34 (1968). No reported
decision, however, has ever held that a housing authority cannot use desirability standards in
deciding which applicants are eligible. Such requirements have been declared invalid, though, when
they attempt to exclude members of a broadly defined class solely because they are members of
the class.
45. 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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broad and vague and, therefore, invalid. The challenged desirability
standards that the court sustained provided that in order to be eligible
for housing, a family must not be: (1) a detriment to the health, safety,
or morals of its neighbors or community, (2) an adverse influence upon
sound family and community life, (3) a source of danger to the peaceful
occupation of the other tenants, (4) a source of danger or cause of
damage to the premises or property of the Authority, or (5) a nuisance."
b. Illegitimacy
Thomas v. Housing Authority47 held that a local housing authority
could not automatically exclude applicants because of one or more
illegitimate children. The court did sanction desirability requirements in
general: ".

.

. the [local housing] Authority must of necessity have the

authority to prescribe reasonable criteria for the screening of applicants
for admission and for the exclusion of those applicants with respect to
whom illegal or disorderly conduct amounting to a nuisance may reasonably be anticipated. ' ' 4 Similarly, the court reasoned that "[t]he
Housing Authority is not required to tolerate criminal activities within
the facilities, or disorderly conduct, or conduct amounting to a nuisance
or which seriously violates ordinary standards of decency."' , However,
the court held that "the fatal vices of the [unwed mother] policy are its
inflexibility, and its general disharmony with the spirit and aim of the
low-rent housing program."5 The decision stands for the proposition
that the fact of illegitimacy may carry some presumptive weight in the
consideration of applicants, but may not be used to automatically exclude unwed mothers from public housing.
In 1970 another federal district court construed the Thomas decision narrowly in denying a motion for shelter pendente lite by plaintiffs
who had been denied admission because of illegitimacy. In deciding
McDougal v. Tamsbergjt the court stated that "a large number of illegitimate children, each by different men, is a factor which may be considered by the Housing Authority in screening applicants for its facilities
in order to eliminate those whose conduct might constitute criminal
activity, or disorderly conduct, or which amount to a nuisance or seriously violate ordinary standards of decency. 5' 2 By alleging the illegiti46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 797.
282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 580.
308 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1970).
Id. at 1216.
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macy of plaintiff's five children, the housing authority established a
prima facie case that showed conduct seriously violative of ordinary
standards of decency, and plaintiff's preliminary motion was denied.
HUD Circular (Dec. 18, 1968) seems to codify these results: "b. A
Local Authority may not establish policies which automatically deny
admission or continued occupancy to a particular class, such as...
families having one or more children born out of wedlock . . . ." Although the regulations and the cases uniformly prohibit the use of an
illegitimacy criterion as an automatic determinant of tenant ineligibility, illegitimacy apparently may still be one permissible desirability
standard which is given some weight in screening applicants.
c.

CriminalRecords

HUD Circular (Dec. 18, 1968) states that "families having a police
record" may not be excluded as a class from public housing. Nevertheless, a 1966 New York Supreme Court decision upholding the exclusion
of an individual because of his criminal record may well retain its validity. In Manigo v. New York City Housing Authority, 3 plaintiff's
husband had been arrested seven times in the previous eight years. On
four of those occasions he was determined to be a juvenile delinquent,
and on two occasions he was jailed. In addition, he had been arrested
for the possession of drugs, but these charges had been dropped. The
court sustained the housing authority's decision to deny admission, reasoning that the husband's entire behavior pattern over a period of years
justified considering him undesirable as a prospective tenant. Again, the
purpose of desirability standards received implicit judicial approval:
"There can be no doubt that the [housing authority], to protect the large
concentration of children and elderly persons who reside within its properties, must take steps to prevent the development of unsafe conditions
therein. Without a proper screening of prospective tenants the dangers
to those persons residing therein would be multiplied many times
over." 54
d.

Unpaid Rent

In Neddo v. Housing Authority 5 plaintiff was denied admission on
the grounds that she owed the housing authority rent from a prior
tenancy. Noting that the policy was arbitrary and unreasonable because
53. 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), affd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d 803,
279 N.Y.S.2d 1014, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1008 (1967).
54. 51 Misc. 2d at 831, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
55. 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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it denied admission "regardless of the ability of those persons to have
paid or to pay, and regardless of any change of circumstances establishing an ability to pay in the future," 6 the federal district court concluded
that at least in this case such a policy was too rigid. Accordingly, the
court required the local authority to grant plaintiff a hearing during
which she would have the opportunity to show that she was not liable
for the unpaid rent.
e.

Welfare Recipients

In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. ,5the district court
held that denial of admission to government-assisted housing under the
section 221(d)(3) program solely on the basis of an applicant's status as
a welfare recipient violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Further, the court stated that defendant's selection policy
calling for a "balanced tenant body" vaguely suggested a quota system,
which would be constitutionally impermissible. The issue of automatic
rejection of welfare recipients does not appear to have arisen in connection with low-rent public housing built under the United States Housing
Act of 1937.
IV.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT

Section 1410g(4) of 42 U.S.C. (1970) provides:
the public housing agency shall promptly notify (i) any applicant determined to be
ineligible for admission to the project of the basis for such determination and
provide the applicant upon request, within a reasonable time after the determina-

tion is made, with an opportunity for an informal hearing on such determination . ..

The legislative history of this section states:
The provision for a hearing is not intended to require a formal hearing, which would
impose a burdensome procedure on local housing agencies, but rather that the
applicant be given an opportunity to be heard by an officer or employee of the
agency other than the person who made the determination of ineligibility."

A number of judicial decisions have broadened this limited review
procedure in some instances. In Neddo v. Housing Authority,59 the
court ordered a hearing for an applicant in order to give her an opportunity to show that she was not liable for past due rent that the authority
claimed she owed. Though the court was not altogether clear as to the
56. 335 F. Supp. at 1400. For a complete discussion of the requirement of hearings for
rejected applicants see pp. 770-72 infra.
57. 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
58. 1969 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIvE NEws 1524, 1539.
59. 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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exact form of the hearing, it did provide for an informal procedure to
the extent that no stenographic record was required and that witnesses
need not testify under oath. The court did require, however, that the
applicant be given reasonable notice, that she be allowed counsel at her
own expense, and that the decision be in writing, stating the grounds for
the decision and the evidence relied on. Similarly, in Davis v. Toledo
Metropolitan Housing Authority" a federal district court enjoined defendants "from continuing to refuse the plaintiffs a hearing upon the
question of eligibility for housing."'" The court in Davis gave even fewer
criteria for the required hearing than did the Neddo court holding simply that an "evidentiary hearing" was required.
The New York Court of Appeals has held, however, that no evidentiary hearing is required when an applicant is determined ineligible. In
Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority" the trial court held that
a hearing was required, but was reversed by the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, which held that a right to be advised at a
private conference of the reasons for ineligibility is all that is required
when an applicant is declared ineligible. The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the appellate division. Distinguishing cases holding
that benefits conferred on individuals by the government cannot be
terminated without a hearing, the court stated: "It has long been settled
that a party aggrieved by loss of a pre-existing right or privilege may
enjoy procedural rights not available to one denied the right or privilege
in the first instance. 6' 3 The court of appeals further reasoned that
because of the number of applicants for public housing in New York, a
hearing for each applicant declared ineligible would impose too great a
burden on the housing authority. 4
In summary, the federal statute seems to require at least a conference between a rejected applicant and a housing authority official who
did not make the decision of ineligibility. Although some courts have
expanded that right and now require a more formal hearing, others have
declined to do so. Moreover, those courts which have ordered some sort
of expanded hearing for rejected applicants have required fewer formali60. 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
61. Id. at 797.
62. 63 Misc. 2d 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 36 App. Div. 2d 728, 320
N.Y.S.2d 472 (1971), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 420, 278 N.E.2d 892, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 928 (1972).
63. 29 N.Y.2d at 425, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 652, 278 N.E.2d at 894.
64. See also Spady v. Mount Vernon Housing Authority, 70 Misc. 2d 270, 333 N.Y.S.2d
557 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (the court said in dicta that no hearing is required for applicants declared
ineligible).
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ties than are probably required in the case of other tenant grievances,
including evictions.6"
V.

A.

SELECTION

& ASSIGNMENT

OF ELIGIBLE TENANTS

Requirements for Federally Supported Public Housing

After a determination of eligibility for public housing and after
placement of applicants into their respective preference categories (e.g.,
persons displaced by urban renewal, veterans, those with no preference),
the LHA must design a method to assign eligible applicants to available
units. The significance of assignment procedures is indicated by the
existence of racial segregation in public housing and the efforts that
have been made to diminish the extent of that segregation. It is now
clear that the government can no longer provide racially separate but
equal housing facilities as a matter of expressed official policy.66
The more recent developments concerning racial discrimination in
public housing began in 1962 with President Kennedy's Executive Order
11063,67 which declared that housing discrimination is contrary to public
policy. Four years later, the Congress, in Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, proscribed discrimination in federally supported public
housing. 8 Pursuant to section 601 of Title VI, HUD has promulgated
regulations designed to assure the placement of tenants into public housing units in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 9 These regulations include
both general proscriptions against racial discrimination and a specific
requirement in regard to tenant assignment:
A [local housing authority], in operating low-rent housing. . . shall assign eligible
applicants to dwelling units in accordance with a plan . . . providing for assignment on a community-wide basis in sequence based upon the date and time the
application is received, the size or type of unit suitable, and factors affecting
preference or priority established by [the LHA's] regulations, which are not inconsistent with the objectives of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. .....0

HUD Circular RHM 7401.1 (December 30, 1964) establishes
more detailed requirements for tenant assignment designed to ensure
compliance with Title VI and the regulation quoted above. The circular
65. See pp. 777 and 779 infra.
66. See Note, Racial Discriminationin Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1959). See also
Special Project, Public Housing, 22 VAND. L. REV. 875, 938-40 (1969); Note, The Public Housing
Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REV.
871, 875-78 (1966).
67. 37 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
68. Section 601 of Title VI is quoted at p. 758 supra.
69. These regulations are contained in 24 C.F.R. pt. 1.
70. 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(ii) (1972).
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provides two plans from which the local housing authority may choose.
Alternatively, the LHA may continue to use its previous plan if, inter
alia, that plan produces a greater degree of occupancy and desegregation than either of the two prescribed plans. The first of the two prescribed assignment plans provides that applicants are to be offered vacancies in the order in which their names appear on a community-wide
waiting list of eligible applicants for a particular type dwelling. If an
applicant rejects an offer, he is to be moved to the last place on the
waiting list. The second prescribed plan has been termed the "free
choice" plan. Under this plan, if there are vacancies at three projects,
the first applicant on the list is offered a unit in the project with the most
vacancies. If he rejects that unit, he may be offered units in the other
two projects; if he rejects both, he is moved to the bottom of the list. If
there are only two locations with suitable vacancies, the first eligible
applicant is offered a vacancy in the project with the most vacancies
and, upon rejection, a unit in the other project. If he rejects both of
these, he is moved to last place on the list of eligible applicants. Should
there be only one project with suitable vacancies, the first eligible applicant is offered a unit therein and, if he rejects it, he may be offered a
unit in the next project in which a suitable vacancy occurs. Upon rejection of both offers, he is moved to the bottom of the list. Some variation
is allowed in the plan, but an applicant gets only three rejections at
most. If the applicant can show some good reason not related to race,
color, or national origin for rejecting an offer, then that rejection is not
counted against him. An example of a good reason for rejection is
inaccessibility of the offered location to the applicant's place of employment.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority71 demonstrates that even
these rather elaborate regulations have not completely eliminated racial
discrimination in assigning tenants to low-rent housing. In that case, the
district court found that quotas set by the Chicago Housing Authority
limited the number of blacks who could be admitted to four housing
projects located in white neighborhoods. As shown in an appendix to
the subsequent judgment order in Gautreaux, CHA had submitted a
plan to HUD which on its face revealed no signs of quotas and which
complied with the HUD regulations. 72 To remedy the segregated housing conditions created by these quotas, the court ordered a complicated
73
scheme of tenant assignment to be used by the CHA.
71.
72.
73.

296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
304 F. Supp. 736, 742-43 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
This scheme is set forth at 304 F. Supp. 736, 739-40.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

In contrast to the Gautreaux decision the district court in
Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority7 4 refused to
order the Austin, Texas, Housing Authority (AHA) to submit a comprehensive desegregation scheme for its projects. Finding that the housing authority had recently adopted the HUD "freedom of choice" plan,
the court decided that it was not clear that racial segregation existing
in Austin's public housing would continue under the plan. The court did,
however, enjoin the AHA from even the slightest departure from the
"freedom of choice" plan.75
B.

Requirementsfor State Supported Housing

In Holmes v. New York City HousingAuthority76 31 eligible applicants for public housing, representing the class of all eligible applicants,
alleged a number of procedural deficiencies in the housing authority's
selection process and claimed such deficiencies increased the opportunity for favoritism and arbitrariness on the part of the housing authority.
Since an "objective scoring system" was already in effect for federally
supported projects, plaintiffs' allegations related only to admission procedures for projects financed by the state. The Second Circuit held that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause requires the housing
authority to employ some ascertainable standard to establish preferences among otherwise eligible applicants. Moreover, the court ordered
that further selection be made in some reasonable fashion and suggested
assignment by lot or by chronological order of application.
C. Requirements for Federally Assisted, Privately Owned Housing
In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc.7" a federal district
court followed the Holmes decision and held that the owner of a section
221(d)(3) project was required to complete an investigation of applicants' eligibility and notify applicants of the results of that investigation
within a time limit agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, the owner was
required to maintain a chronological waiting list so that applicants
could gauge their waiting time.

74. 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
75. One additional procedure is the requirement found in 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(4)(ii) (1973
Supp.) that the local housing authority advises eligible applicants "of the approximate date of
occupancy insofar as such date can be reasonably determined."
76. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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EVICTION

Introduction

Two general issues have arisen with respect to evictions from lowrent public housing. The first concerns procedural rights to be afforded
a tenant before he is evicted from a public housing project. The second
major issue involves the reasons for which a tenant may be evicted. The
procedural question has been the subject of much litigation and some
rather clear answers have emerged; the question of what reasons will
support an eviction, however, has not been answered uniformly.
B.

Pre-EvictionProceduralRequirements
1.

The Early Case Law

Brand v. Chicago HousingAuthority 8 provides the leading case in
a series of decisions holding that simple termination of a lease in accordance with its notice provisions is sufficient to evict tenants from public
housing projects. In Brand no reason was required for a termination,
and the legal relationship between public housing authorities and their
tenants was equated with that between landlords and tenants in the
private sector.79
An exception to the early rule that evictions could be effected by
simple termination of the lease developed in several "Gwinn Amendment" cases. The Gwinn Amendment was enacted as a rider to an
appropriations bill in 195310 and provided generally that no person who
was a member of any organization designated as subversive by the
United States Attorney General could occupy federally supported hous-81
ing. The leading Gwinn Amendment case is Rudder v. United States,
which held that the application of the Amendment violated plaintiff's
due process rights. In a statement widely quoted in subsequent cases,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
emphasized that it was holding the public landlord to higher standards
than private landlords in its dealing with tenants: "The government as
78. 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941).
79. Other early cases reached similar results. See, e.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz.
26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949); Chicago Housing Authority v. Ivory, 341 III. App. 282, 93 N.E.2d 386
(1950); Municipal Housing Authority v. Walck, 277 App. Div. 791, 97 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Simpson, 85 Ohio App. 331, 85 N.E.2d 560
(Ct. App. 1949); Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Stires, 84 Ohio App. 73, 84 N.E.2d
296 (Ct. App. 1949); Housing Authority v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1963).
80. Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1953, ch. 578, 66 Stat. 393, 402-03.
81. 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike

private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law.
Arbitrary action is not due process." 82

The courts, however, did not apply the rationale of the Gwinn
Amendment cases to evictions based on other reasons or evictions where
no reason at all was given. For example, in Housing Authority v.
Turner the court concluded that despite the Gwinn Amendment cases

and their holding that tenants could not be evicted from public housing
for unconstitutional reasons, evictions where no reason was given were
not prohibited. Early judicial reluctance to expand tenants' procedural
rights prior to eviction is further evident in several New York state court
decisions. In these decisions, if the local housing authority had abided
by its own rules and regulations concerning eviction of tenants, then
their actions were sustained, at least if the action was not arbitrary or
capricious.84
2.

The Evolution of the Right to a Pre-Eviction Hearing

In order to stop eviction of tenants by a simple unexplained cancellation of the lease, HUD Circular (February 7, 1967) was promulgated.
This circular required that every evicted tenant be given a reason for his

eviction and that the tenant, in a "private conference or other appropriate manner," be "given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish."

The circular was made binding on public housing authorities by the
5 This case
Supreme Court in Thorpe v. HousingAuthority."
arose when
defendant housing authority notified the president-elect of a tenants'
organization that her lease would not be renewed. Defendant gave no
reason for the lease termination but merely served the notice in accordance with the notice provision of the lease. Plaintiff's eviction was sus82. Id. at 53. Other Gwinn Amendment cases, all striking down the application ot the
provision, include: Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956); Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d
522 (1954); Kutcher v. Housing Authority, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Peters v. New York
City Housing Authority, 9 Misc. 2d 942, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Lawson v. Housing
Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). Since the Gwinn
Amendment was allowed to lapse in 1955, there has been no further litigation on the issue.
83. 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963).
84. Austin v. New York City Housing Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 206, 267 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); Smalls v. White Plains Housing Authority, 34 Misc. 2d 949, 230 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); New York City Housing Authority v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup.
Ct. 1960); New York City Housing Authority v. Russ, I Misc. 2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
85. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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tained by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 86 After the United
States Supreme Court had granted certiorari, 7 HUD issued the February 7, 1967 circular, and the Supreme Court remanded the case to the88
North Carolina Supreme Court for a decision in light of the circular.
The North Carolina court refused to apply the new regulations and
again sustained the eviction.89 The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision and, in addition to declaring the circular
binding on the local housing authority, held that it applied retroactively
" ' The Supreme Court declined, however, to rule on plainto plaintiff.89
tiff's request that the Court order a hearing complete with guidelines
comporting with due process requirements. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that the request was premature because the plaintiff might voluntarily vacate upon hearing the reason for her eviction, or, if she objected
to the reason, the housing authority might voluntarily decide to grant
the kind of hearing she desired.
One year later, however, the Second Circuit was confronted with
the issue of procedural due process and ruled that the local housing
authority must provide tenants an opportunity for a pre-eviction hearing. In Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority" the court held
that full compliance with the requirements of the HUD circular was not
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. The court prescribed several elements of a hearing which
must be present to satisfy tenants' due process rights. First, notice prior
to the hearing must "insure that the tenant is adequately informed of
the evidence against him so he can effectively rebut the evidence." 9
Secondly, the decision must be based solely on evidence presented at the
hearing, and, although a full written opinion is not necessary, the housing authority is required to state in writing the reasons for its final
decision and provide an indication of the evidence on which it relied in
reaching that decision. Thirdly, the tenant must be afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine any witness who contributes evidence influential in the decision. Finally, the decision must be rendered
by an impartial hearing examiner. The court sanctioned the use of a
hearing board comprised of officers of the housing authority so long as
members of the board took no, or only minimal, part in making the
86.
87.
88.
89.
89.1.
90.
91.

Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966).
385 U.S. 967 (1966).
386 U.S. 670 (1966).
Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1967).
393 U.S. 268 (1969).
425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 862.
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initial decision to evict the tenant whose appeal was being heard. In
summary of its holding, the court declared that "[a]lthough a fullfledged adversary hearing need not be afforded in all cases, the tenant
must be adequately informed of the nature of the evidence against him
9' 2
and accorded an adequate opportunity to rebut the evidence.
Shortly after Escalera was decided, the Fourth Circuit considered
the same issue when a district court had granted the housing authority's
motion to dismiss the tenant's complaint. In Caulderv. Durham Housing Authority. 3 The court of appeals applied the test used by the
United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelley94 and balanced the
nature and extent of the tenant's loss against the LHA's need for summary adjudication. Finding the loss suffered by a tenant evicted from
public housing "grievous," the court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to order a hearing substantially similar to that
ordered in Escalera. In a footnote, the court recognized that on remand
the housing authority might be able to present some compelling reasons
for summary procedure. If this occurred, the district court was ordered
to decide the weight due such reasons and balance them against the
tenant's loss. 5 Escalera and Caulder were followed by a federal district
court in Maeberry v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority." The
Maeberry court held that both notice and a hearing were required and
declared that a tenant must be given the opportunity to have counsel
present at the hearing. The court rejected, however, plaintiff's request
that either the housing authority or the local welfare agency be required
97
to pay the attorney's fee.
In some instances state statutes may deal with the problem of preeviction hearings. For example, a Michigan statute provides for a Board
of Tenant Affairs composed of eight to twenty members, one-half of
whom must be tenants. The Board has authority to review any eviction
decision made by the local housing authority and its decision is binding
on the authority. The statute provides that "[t]he tenant . . . shall be
entitled to a fair hearing before the board and shall have the right to be
92. Id. at 863. "
93. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
94. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process rights of welfare recipient prior to termination of
benefits).
95. 433 F.2d 998 at 1004 n.3.
96. 341 F. Supp. 643 (D. Minn. 1971).
97. Three other significant pre-1971 decisions have held that due process requires that tenants be provided with a pre-eviction hearing. Shepard v. Chicago Housing Authority, CCH Pov.
L. REP.
12,760 (N.D. II1. 1971); Ruffin v. Housing Authority, 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969);
Williams v. White Plains Housing Authority, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 35 App. Div.
965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970) (involving a housing project supported exclusively by state funds).
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represented by counsel."" No mention is made as to whether a "fair
hearing" includes a right of confrontation and cross-examination of
persons supplying information adverse to the tenant, and no reported
decision on this point has been found. 9
3.

Judicial Hearings as a Substitutefor Administrative Hearings

In Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,100 the Second
Circuit noted that a tenant could institute a proceeding in a state court
to overturn the threatened eviction, staying the eviction order in the
interim. The Escalera court held, however, that this judicial review was
not an adequate substitute for an administrative hearing. The court
reasoned that the tenant's burden of proving arbitrary and capricious
action or abuse of discretion by the housing authority was too great in
a judicial proceeding. The Fourth Circuit has ruled, however, that a
South Carolina law that provides for judicial proceedings including a
full review of the factual basis on which the eviction decision was based,
and that allows a tenant to demand a jury trial, obviates the necessity
for an administrative hearing. 0 1 The court noted that the South Carolina provision requires the housing authority to prove its allegations at
a full trial before it can obtain an eviction order; therefore, tenants are
already afforded due process prior to evictions. At least three courts
have rejected the Tamsberg decision that a judicial trial obviates the
need for an administrative hearing. In Glover v. Housing Authority,'
the court of appeals rejected defendant's argument that an evidentiary
hearing conducted by the district court made unnecessary a requirement
that the housing authority provide an administrative hearing: "[W]e
think this argument misses the point that it is a hearing within the
administrative framework to which [the plaintiff] is entitled."'' 3 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed Glover, despite a two-judge dissent which would have adopted the Tamsberg decision.'" 4 Finally, in
98. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.3056(3)-(8) (1969).
99. The literature on procedural due process in connection with eviction from public housing
includes: Schoshinski, Public Landlordsand Tenants: A Survey of the Developing Law, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 399, 447-55; Special Project, Public Housing, 22 VAND. L. REV. 875, 944-53 (1969); Note,
Nonfinancial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The Problem Family in the
Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122 (1968); Comment, Eviction Procedures in Public
Housing, 73 DICK. L. REV. 307 (1968); Note, The Government as Proprietor,55 VA. L. REV. 1079

(1969).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1970).
444 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 161-62.
Housing Authority v. Mosby, 53 Wis. 2d 275, 192 N.W.2d 913 (1972).
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Brown v. Housing Authority,"5 a federal district court in Wisconsin

reasoned that requiring a tenant to wait out the 30-day notice period
before he is brought into court was a hardship and that most tenants
would not be bold enough to hire counsel and endure the trial. Therefore, the court concluded, as a practical matter most tenants would feel
compelled to begin looking for another place to live at the beginning of
the 30-day period.
4. Recent Developments

The most significant single development in the law governing tenants' procedural rights is the issuance of HUD Circular RHM 7465.9
(February 22, 1971). The circular provides that:
A tenant shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial official
or a hearing panel if he disputes within a reasonable time any LHA action or failure
to act in accordance with the lease requirments, or any LHA action or failure to
act involving interpretation or application of the LHA's regulations, policies or
procedures which adversely affect the tenant's rights, duties, welfare or status.

This regulation requires that if a hearing panel is established, it must
have an uneven number of panelists, and, if LHA officials are appointed
to the panel, tenants must be represented in the same number and there
must be an impartial tie breaker. Furthermore, the circular provides
that within a reasonable time the tenant must receive notice of the
complete grounds or reasns for the LHA's action and of the rules and
regulations governing the hearing. Moreover, the tenant is to be afforded an opportunity to present his case and be represented by counsel
if he chooses, and the right to present a case includes the right to present
witnesses and to "confront and cross-examine witnesses in appropriate
circumstances." The decision of the hearing panel or official must be
in writing and must state the reasons and evidence relied on for the
decision. The decision is binding on the housing authority unless it
determines "that the hearing panel has acted arbitrarily or exceeded its
authority," in which case the matter may be judicially reviewed. Finally,
if the LHA determines that a tenant's grievance has been decided in a
previous panel decision on the same or similar set of facts and for that
reason refuses to grant a hearing, both the LHA and the tenant are free
to pursue other appropriate relief. The circular also provides that the
LHA may adopt the hearing procedure to deal with applicants' grievances. In an appendix to the circular is a Model Grievance Procedure
that local housing authorities may adopt at their discretion. Included in
this procedure is a provision regarding notice to the tenant to vacate
105.

340 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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upon a hearing panel decision that upholds an eviction. Significantly,
this provision provides that if the tenant chooses not to vacate but
instead to contest legal action commenced to compel vacation, the housing authority must "prove that the reasons upon which it originally
relied constituted good cause for eviction under the applicable law, rules
and regulations."
Thus far, the circular has been almost universally accepted by those
courts which have considered it. The first federal decision to involve the
circular was Glover v. Housing Authority."6 The Fifth Circuit declined
to decide Glover on the basis of plaintiff's constitutional claim that due
process required a pre-eviction hearing, but rather held that the HUD
Circular required the housing authority to grant an administrative hearing prior to dispossessing a tenant.' 7
5. Government-Assisted Privately Owned Housing
In McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc.,"°8 the Second Circuit held
that receipts by a privately owned corporation of federal benefits in the
form of mortgage insurance did not constitute state action and that
defendant would be held to no higher standard of due process in connection with evictions than any other private landlord. When benefits from
the government are more extensive, however, more stringent requirements of due process have been imposed. In McQueen v. Druker, °9
defendant was a private corporation receiving government assistance
under the 221(d)(3) program that involves, in addition to mortgage
106. 444 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1971).
107. A federal district court also cited the circular with apparent approval, but seemed to
base its decision that a hearing is prerequisite to eviction on constitutional due process grounds.
Brown v. Housing Authority, 340 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Two state courts have applied
the circular. The first was Chicago Housing Authority v. Harris, 49 Ill. 2d 274, 275 N.E.2d 353
(1971). In the second, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the circular retroactively to all tenants
who were evicted subsequent to the date of its publication, February 22, 1971, but who had not
vacated the premises. In the case of those who vacated, however, the circular would not apply.
Housing Authority v. Mosby, 53 Wis. 2d 275, 192 N.W.2d 913 (1972).
A direct attack on the validity of the circular was defeated in Housing Authority v. United
States Housing Authority, 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972). Twenty-four housing authorities joined in a
federal court suit seeking to enjoin the application of the circulars on the grounds that they were
not promulgated in accordance with a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act requiring
publication of agency regulations in the Federal Register and that they exceeded HUD's authority
to regulate the affairs of the local housing authorities. The district court held for plaintiffs and
enjoined the implementation of the circular. Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority, 54 F.R.D. 402 (D. Neb. 1972). The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the district court and
remanded with instructions to enter judgment upholding the validity of the circulars. Housing
Authority v. United States Housing Authority, 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972).
108. 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970).
109. 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971), affg 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970).
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insurance, financial assistance from the government to lower the interest
rate on the sponsoring corporation's note and supplement the rent of
low-income tenants. The court, in holding that a tenant could not be
evicted in retaliation for the exercise of her first amendment rights,
reasoned that "at least when a specific governmental function is carried
out by heavily subsidized private firms or individuals whose freedom of
decision-making has, by contract and the reserved governmental power
of continuing oversight, been circumscribed substantially more than
that generally accorded an independent contractor, the coloration of
state action fairly attaches."110
The extent to which a private, government-assisted housing project
must afford due process to tenants where state action is found has been
discussed by at least one state court. Fuller v. Understadt"I involved a
project which was owned and managed by a private corporation which
received financial assistance from the state and whose operations were
subject to state regulations. The state aid was held sufficient to subject
the corporation to fourteenth amendment due process requirements.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the extent to which the
corporation must afford its tenants due process is not the same as a
public housing authority: "The test is the limited one of arbitrariness
and does not involve a full evidentiary hearing or the full scope review
of administrative quasi-judicial action which must be supported by substantial evidence ..
,,".. The tenant must, however, be given an opportunity to explain or deny the charges made against him." 3
C. Substantive Reasonsfor Evictions
Except to provide for the eviction of over-income tenants," 4 the
United States Housing Act of 1937 is silent as to permissible reasons
for the eviction of public housing tenants. The Act qualifies its require110. 438 F.2d at 784-85. The district court had found that the eviction was in retaliation for
the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and the court of appeals affirmed the holding that
plaintiff could not be evicted on those grounds. The court declined to decide whether notice of good
cause and a fair hearing was required in every instance of eviction because the resolution of that
question was unnecessary for its decision.
11.
28 N.Y.2d 315, 270 N.E.2d 321, 321 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971), noted in 21 BUFFALO L.
REv. 524 (1972).
112. 28 N.Y.2d at 318, 270 N.E.2d at 323, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
113. The Fuller case was followed in Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Development Fund
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1972), involving a defendant being assisted
by the federal government through the § 236 program, the successor to 221(d)(3). For a decision
requiring an urban renewal agency to grant a hearing prior to eviction see Johnson v. White Plains
Urban Renewal Agency, 65 Misc. 2d 293, 317 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970).
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ment of eviction of over-income tenants by providing for postponement of eviction if the local housing authority determines that the overincome tenant cannot find suitable private housing within his income
range." 5
Most state enabling statutes are also silent as to permissible reasons for eviction of tenants from public housing. Of those which do list
permissible reasons for eviction,"' the Michigan statute, for example,
provides:
(1) No tenancy ... shall be terminated by the project management or the local
housing commission except for just cause.
(2) Just cause to terminate a tenancy. . . includes, but is not limited to: a failure
to comply with the obligations of the lease or the lawful rules and regulations of
the housing commission; the use of a unit for any unlawful purpose; the maintenance of any unsafe, unsanitary or unhealthful condition in any dwelling unit or in
any of the common areas; and ineligibility for continued occupancy by reason of
over-income."'

Some direction is given to local housing authorities in HUD Circular RHM 7465.8 (February 22, 1971), which requires or recommends a
number of provisions for inclusion in tenants' leases. One requirement
is that the lease set forth "[t]he circumstances under which management
may terminate the lease, all limited to good cause. . . ." Attached to
the circular is a Model Lease. While the fourteen requirements set out
in the circular must be reflected in all leases, HUD recommends, but
does not require, the adoption of the Model Lease in its entirety. One
of the discretionary clauses of the Model Lease, which may or may not
be adopted by the LHA's, lists reasons for which a tenant may be
evicted:
Such notice [of termination] may only be given for good cause, such as nonpayment
of rent, serious or repeated damage to the premises, creation of physical hazards,

or over-income status.

Since there is only one federal statutory provision and no binding
regulations, and since most state statutes do not deal extensively with
evictions, development of reasons for eviction has been left to local
housing authorities. Examples of common grounds for eviction developed by housing authorities include those listed in the Model Lease
clause quoted above.1 s
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970).
116.

E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-25-18.1(1)(C) (1970); MICH. STAT. ANN.

§

5.3054(1)

(1969).
117.

MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3054(1) (1969).

118. For a helpful critical analysis of eviction criteria, with emphasis on those developed by
the New York City Housing Authority, see Schoshinski, Public Landlordsand Tenants: A Survey
of the Developing Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 436-45. Further literature helpful to an understanding

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Few judicial guidelines for permissible reasons for eviction have
developed. The early Gwinn Amendment cases, exemplified by Rudder
v. United States"' and Lawson v. Housing Authority,' established the
principle that a tenant cannot be evicted for unconstitutional reasons.
In Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority' a federal district court found the reason for eviction to be the tenant's organizational activities among other tenants-activities which the court decided were protected by the first amendment. The eviction was voided
because "a tenant's continued occupancy in a public housing project
cannot be conditioned upon the tenant's foregoing his Constitutional
rights."' 2 2 In Thorpe v. Housing Authority,2 3 plaintiff claimed her eviction was in retaliation for her efforts to organize tenants. Although the
Supreme Court vacated per curiam the North Carolina Supreme Court
decision upholding the eviction123-' and remanded to the state court
for a determination of tenant's rights to a pre-eviction hearing in light
of a newly promulgated HUD Circular,23 .2 a concurring opinion by
Justice Douglas suggested that a tenant may not be evicted for the
exercise of a constitutionally protected right: "The recipient of a government benefit, be it a tax exemption. . . .unemployment compensation
.... public employment . . , a license to practice law . . . , or a
home in a public housing project cannot be made to forfeit the benefit
because he exercises a constitutional right."'2 4 Douglas did suggest,
however, several reasons that he considered valid grounds for the eviction of a public housing tenant: "A tenant may be evicted if it is shown
that he is destroying the fixtures, defacing the walls, disturbing other
tenants by boisterous conduct and for a number of other reasons which
impair the successful operation of the housing project. Eviction for such
reasons will completely protect the viability of the housing project without making the tenant a serf who has a home at the pleasure of the
manager of the project or the housing authority."' 2 1 Several state court
of eviction criteria includes: Special Project, PublicHousing,22 VAND. L. REV. 875, 945-56 (1969);
Note, Nonfinancial Eligibilityand Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The Problem Family
in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1122, 1128-34.
119. 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
120. 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
121. 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966); accord, McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.
1971).
122. 266 F. Supp. at 401.
123. 386 U.S. 670 (1969).
123.1. Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966).
123.2. HUD Circular (Feb. 7, 1967), quoted at 386 U.S. 670, 672-73 n.3 (1967).
124. 386 U.S. at 678-79 (Douglas, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 679-80.
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decisions have sanctioned evictions for various reasons. While these
decisions arguably approved the reasons assigned by the LHA, the real
basis of the decisions seems to be a general approval of the housing
authorities' actions so long as they complied with their own rules and
regulations.'
Evictions on the basis of misrepresentation have been upheld by
state courts. In Housing Authority v. Allard 27 the Rhode Island Supreme Court seemed to approve implicitly an eviction on the grounds
of misrepresentation as long as a jury found that the misrepresentation
resulted in the housing authority's signing the lease. The Georgia Supreme Court has also sustained an eviction based on misrepresentation.
In Williams v. Housing Authority 8 the court upheld the housing authority's finding that the plaintiff was guilty of misrepresentation in
failing to report the birth of an illegitimate child and falsifying the
identity of the father of some of her children. The court thought the
misrepresentation was serious, declaring that the maintenance of a high
moral standard in the housing project was a justifiable concern of the
housing authority. It is possible, however, that the effect of this case
may be limited in future decisions by its rather extreme facts-the
tenant had a number of illegitimate children, apparently fathered by
several different men. In addition, there was some evidence, although
controverted, that a man was living with the plaintiff at the time of the
eviction notice.
Perhaps the best-reasoned decision on the subject of eviction criteria is Sanders v. Cruise.1 9 The New York Housing Authority notified
the plaintiffs that they would be evicted because their son was a drug
addict, making them undesirable tenants. The court annulled the eviction on the ground that the basis for the eviction was unreasonable. The
housing authority had based its decision of plaintiffs' nondesirability on
a regulation providing that a family would be considered nondesirable
if it constitutes: "(1) a detriment to the health, safety or morals of its
neighbors or the community, (2) an adverse influence upon sound family
and community life, (3) a source of danger or a cause of damage to
126. See, e.g., Austin v. New York City Housing Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 206, 267 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (nondesirability); Smalls v. White Plains Housing Authority, 34 Misc. 2d 949,
230 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (misconduct of tenant's children); New York City Housing
Authority v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (husband of tenant was
incarcerated after being convicted of a crime); New York City Housing Authority v. Russ, I Misc.
2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (nondesirability).
127. 106 R.I. 7, 255 A.2d 158 (1969) (reversing the trial court's decision on a procedural
error).
128. 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
129. 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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premises or property of the Authority, (4) a source of danger to the

peaceful occupation of the other tenants, or (5) a nuisance."', The
court found the standard set forth in the quoted regulations was itself
reasonable and necessary, but held that the authority's application of
the standard to the facts of this case could not support a reasonable
finding of nondesirability:
Here, the only fact adduced is that John [the plaintiffs son] has been a drug addict,
convicted three times for narcotics offenses. No facts are presented to warrant the
conclusion that John committed any overt act detrimental to the health, safety or
morals of the other tenants in [the housing project], or that his addiction to narcotics was known to the neighbors or the community, or that such addiction was a
source of danger or a cause of damage to [anyone or to any property] ....
To evict tenants from a public housing project on the sole ground that their adult
son was a drug addict exceeds any reasonable requirement for the peaceful occupancy of the project and for the preservation of property.' 3 1

The most explicit judicial statement in connection with eviction
criteria is found in an order entered by a federal district court setting
forth permissible grounds for the termination of a tenant's lease. The
permissible reasons include:
(I) [m]isrepresentation or concealment of a tenant's eligibility for continued residency; (2) undesirability, which is defined as conduct imperiling the health, safety
or morals of the tenant's neighbors or is a source of danger to the property or
peaceful occupation of the other residents. Among other things, specific criminal
conduct is set forth, established patterns of undesirable behavior are listed, and a
pattern of poor housekeeping is included; (3) breach of the rules and regulations;
(4) chronic delinquency in the payment of rent; (5) failure to furnish satisfactory
verification of income; (6) annual income that exceeds the maximum income allowable; and (7) occupation of an apartment by a residual single member of a family
where the unit was originally assigned to an entire family.'

VIII.

TENANT GRIEVANCES

Unlike the areas of site selection, admission, and eviction, tenant
complaints concerning housing authority management have not been
the source of much litigation. Nevertheless, a number of LHA practices
have engendered complaints from tenants, and HUD has promulgated
rulings designed to eliminate practices giving rise to some of the more
commonly voiced complaints and to provide for a fair procedure for the
resolution of tenant grievances.
HUD Circular RHM 7465.9 (February 22, 1971), discussed previously, gives public housing tenants the right to an administrative hear130. 10 Misc. 2d at 535, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
131. 10 Misc. 2d at 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
132. Shepard v. Chicago Housing Authority, CCH Pov. L. REP.
III. 1971).

12,760, at 12,727 (N.D.
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ing when they feel that the LHA has not acted in accordance with its
33
rules and regulations or lease requirements.
Two other circulars, designed to prohibit some common lease provisions which had been the source of much dissatisfaction among tenants'34 and to require the inclusion of other clauses intended to obviate
many frequent grievances, 3 ' have also been published. The August 10,
1970, circular sets out six clauses often found in adhesion contracts,
orders them eliminated from existing leases, and prohibits their use in
future leases. Clauses authorizing the LHA's attorney to confess judgment against the tenant in legal proceedings and clauses in which the
tenant "agrees" to hold the LHA harmless for injuries caused by its
negligence are proscribed. The February 22, 1971, circular requires
fourteen clauses to be included in the lease. Most of these clauses are
designed to prohibit LHA practices which had given rise to complaints
from tenants. One clause provides for the use of a separate legal process
to collect monetary claims for damages. Such monetary claims are
usually punitive assessments for a breach of housing authority rules or
a charge for damage to housing authority property caused by the tenant.
The practice of many housing authorities has been to add such assessments to the rent, nonpayment of which is grounds for eviction. 3" The
requirement of separate legal process to collect such damages should
prevent the practice of adding the amount to the rent and alleviate one
source of contention between LHA's and tenants. A second significant
required clause demands the LHA to acknowledge its duty "to maintain
the building and any unassigned community areas in a decent, safe, and
sanitary condition in accordance with local housing codes and HUD
regulations, and its obligations for failure to do so." This requirement
may provide tenants with a viable tool for forcing LHA's to upgrade
projects which have deteriorated to the point of becoming substandard.
Heretofore, no effective remedy for substandard housing has been developed. 3 Moreover, if the courts elect to construe the circular
broadly, this requirement could form the basis for injunctive relief compelling the housing authority to provide sufficient police protection at
133. The mechanics of the hearing procedure are presented at pp. 780-81 supra.
134. HUD Circular RHM 7465.6 (Aug. 10, 1970).
135. HUD Circular RHM 7465.8 (Feb. 22, 1971).
136. See Escalera v. Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 860 (2d Cir. 1970); Note, Fines in
Public Housing, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1968).
137. See Schoshinski, PublicLandlordsand Tenants: A Survey ofthe Developing Law, 1969
DUKE L.J. 399, 401-17; Note, Remedies for Tenants in SubstandardPublic Housing, 68 COLUM.

L.

REV.

561 (1968).
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its projects to assure the safety of the tenants, especially in those projects where the LHA has already undertaken to provide some, but not
13 8
enough, police protection.
Edward J. Ashton
David E. Brand
Richard K. Greenstein
Andrew M. Kaufman
Susan Sgarlat Lissitzyn
John K. Ross, Jr.
138. Attempts to get additional police protection have had mixed results. Compare New
York City Housing Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Civ. Ct. New York
County 1968) and New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson, 58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d
237 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1968), with Bass v. New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801
(Sup. Ct. 1969).

